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1INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION: 
ECONOMIC AND EMPIRICAL 
PERSPECTIVES
Michael Faure and Wanli Ma?
I.  Introduction
Legal scholars and practitioners alike have expressed increased 
criticism of the current dispute resolution mechanism between sovereign 
states and private investors.1 That system, known as the investor-state 
arbitration (“ISA”) system,2 is largely based on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States (the “ICSID Convention”) and is primarily governed by the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”).3
Investor-state arbitrations are usually administered either by ICSID or on an 
? Michael Faure is a Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law 
at Masstricht University. He also serves as the Academic Director of the Ius Commune 
Research School and the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal Research.  
Wanli Ma is a researcher at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is a PhD student at the 
Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics and focuses on international investment law. We 
are grateful to the participants in the conference ‘Reforming the Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement System: EU and Chinese Perspectives’ (Wuhan, China, 17–18 October 2017), to 
the participants in the authors’ closed-door meeting (Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 20 April 
2018), to the participants in the BACT staff seminar (Rotterdam, The Netherlands, 11 October 
2018), to the participants in the Third AFED Conference (Nancy, France, 12 October 2018), 
and more particularly to Chris Reinders-Folmer and Sharon Oded for their useful comments 
on earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to the student editors of the Michigan Journal of 
International Law and to Marianne Breijer for their valuable comments.
1. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, At the Edge of Chaos? Foreign Investment Law as a 
Complex Adaptive System, How It Emerged and How It Can Be Reformed, 29 ICSID REV. -
FOREIGN INV. L.J. 372, 372–418 (2014); Rachel L. Wellhausen, Recent Trends in Investor-
State Dispute Settlement, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 117, 117–19 (2016).
2. Investor-state arbitration is also widely known as investor-state dispute settlement 
(“ISDS”) in the literature of this field. Thus, the two terms will be used interchangeably in this 
article.
3. William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public 
Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 284 
(2010). The functionality of investor-state arbitration is conceptualized by Sergio Puig in three 
ways: First, it serves to resolve disputes between foreign investors and host states; second, it 
aims to depoliticize investment disputes; third, it eliminates or reduces the impediments to the 
free flow of private investments posed by non-commercial risks. See Sergio Puig, No Right 
without a Remedy: Foundations of Investor-State Arbitration, 35 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 829, 848 
(2014).
2 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 41:1
ad hoc basis under the arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).4
Developing countries, in particular, accuse the ICSID-governed ISA 
system of being biased toward investors.5 Some developing countries have 
withdrawn or have threatened to withdraw from the ICSID system.6 Many 
states therefore claim that the current ISA system has to be reformed to be 
less biased against states and to better represent their interests. In particular, 
states have expressed earnest concern that ISA is inappropriately modeled 
on commercial arbitration’s procedural rules (and the confidentiality 
obligations they convey), given the public interests often implicated in ISA 
disputes.7 The opaque nature of the arbitration system is often regarded as 
accountable for the ISA system’s legitimacy crisis.8 In response, the 
European Union (“EU”) has proposed to replace the arbitration system with 
4. Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the 
Revisions and Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 LAW &
BUS. REV. AM. 885, 885 (2007). 
5. ICSID in Crisis: Straight-Jacket or Investment Protection?, BRETTON WOODS 
PROJECT (July 10, 2009), https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2009/07/art-564878. See 
generally Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID in Latin America, 16 L. &
BUS. REV. AM. 409 (2010); Diana Marie Wick, The Counter-Productivity of ICSID 
Denunciation and Proposals for Change, 11 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 239 (2011). As the U.N. 
Conference on Trade and Development (“UNCTAD”) notes, “There are concerns that the 
current mechanism exposes host States to additional legal and financial risks, often unforeseen 
at point of entering into the IIA and in circumstances beyond clear-cut infringements on 
private property, without necessarily bringing any benefits in terms of additional FDI flows 
[and] . . . that it can create the risk of a ‘regulatory chill’ on legitimate government 
policymaking.” UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International 
Investment Governance 128, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf.
6. The backlash against ISA can be illustrated by the grievance of Bolivian President 
Evo Morales that, under the current ISA system, developing countries in Latin America have 
never won a dispute, while transnational corporations have always won. See, e.g., Charles N. 
Brower & Sadie Blanchard, What’s in a Meme? The Truth About Investor-State Arbitration: 
Why It Need Not, and Must Not, Be Repossessed by States, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689, 
691–95 (2014); Susan D. Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435, 436–37 (2009).
7. In form, investor-state arbitration is said to be somewhat modeled on “private”
commercial arbitration, but the nature of investor-state disputes often relates to the regulatory 
autonomy of sovereign states and their agencies. The private nature of the arbitration system 
for investor-state disputes can be witnessed in the fact that: “Investment arbitrators are ad hoc
appointees, not domestic judges holding permanent office. ICSID hearings are often 
conducted privately. Third parties, including civic interest groups, are permitted to participate 
in proceedings only if the disputing parties consent or if the applicable investment treaty so 
provides.” See Leon E. Trakman, The ICSID Under Siege, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 603, 620–
23 (2012).
8. Because “many ICSID tribunals continue to employ standards of review developed 
from the private law origins of international arbitration,” some states have started to view the 
legitimacy of investor-state arbitration with skepticism. See Burk-White & von Staden, supra
note 3, at 285. 
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a multilateral investment court, and this idea has received support in 
academia.9
Though there is an ongoing debate over how the incentives of 
arbitrators vary from those of judges, it is striking that the Law and 
Economics literature analyzing these incentives in detail is not incorporated 
into that debate.10 There are a few economic studies of the ISA system,11 but 
they do not account for the Law and Economics perspective, which pays 
particular attention to how various institutions and instruments affect the 
incentives of all parties involved. There is, meanwhile, rich empirical 
literature on the practice of ISA,12 but, to the best of our knowledge, the 
results of these empirical studies are neither presented in an integrated 
manner, nor are they considered by the theoretical Law and Economics 
literature.
This article is intended to fill that important gap. It will contribute to the 
debate on the reform of the ISA system by integrating existing Law and 
Economics literature with empirical evidence assessing the theories that this 
literature promotes. This integration will provide useful and important new 
insights for the reform of the current ISA mechanism.
This article starts by presenting the basic Law and Economics insights 
into the differences between arbitration and the court system. In Part II, it 
highlights the arguments in favor of and against the commercial arbitration 
system upon which ISA is modeled by comparing that system to more 
traditional court-based adjudication. Part III sketches the differences 
between the ISA system and commercial arbitration—particularly with 
regard to party and adjudicator incentives, and details the contribution of 
those differences to the success of the ISA mechanism. Then the article 
moves to the rich empirical evidence available on ISA: In Part IV, we 
discuss how the current ISA system works (focusing on arbitration filings, 
claims, and awards). Part V analyzes to what extent these empirical findings 
substantiate the criticisms of ISA formulated in the theoretical literature 
9. It warrants noting that the EU is at the vanguard, advocating the replacement of the 
current arbitration mechanism with a permanent investment court. “By large majority, the 
European Parliament substantially refused the current ISDS system, characterized as an 
outdated model. Notably, the critique against that system was also expressed by a number of 
EU Member States that so far had been pro-ISDS, such as France, Germany and the 
Netherlands, all calling for a permanent investment court.” Piero Bernardini, Reforming 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Need to Balance Both Parties’ Interests, 32 ICSID
REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 38, 40 (2017).
10. Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitration, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 88, 88–93 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
11. See e.g., Jennifer Kirby, Efficiency in International Arbitration: Whose Duty Is It?,
32 J. INT’L ARB. 689, 689–95 (2015).
12. See e.g., Thomas Schultz & Cédric Dupont, Investment Arbitration: Promoting the 
Rule of Law or Over-Empowering Investors? A Quantitative Empirical Study, 25 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 1147, 1147–68 (2015); Gus Van Harten & Pavel Malysheuski, Who Has Benefited 
Financially from Investment Treaty Arbitration? An Evaluation of the Size and Wealth of 
Claimants (Osgoode Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 14, 2016).
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reviewed in Parts II and III. In Part VI, we turn to potential reforms of the 
ISA system, considering how both theoretical law, economic analysis, and 
empirical findings might apply to an investment court or other proposals. 
The article concludes by outlining the key lessons for the international legal 
community drawn from comparing the theoretical Law and Economics 
literature that discusses adjudicative best practices to the empirical data on 
how the ISA system actually functions.
II.  Arbitration Versus the Courts: Theory
To understand some of the criticisms of the ISA system, it is 
worthwhile to review the principal differences between commercial 
arbitration and adjudication in court. Using a Law and Economics 
framework, we will assess the incentives for private parties to use 
arbitration rather than a domestic court system (Section A). Then we will 
focus on the other important stakeholders in dispute settlement—judges and 
arbitrators—and analyze the differences in their incentive structures 
(Section B). Finally, we will compare the social costs of arbitration and the 
court system (Section C).
A.  Why Arbitrate? Incentives for Parties
Why do parties choose, during contract formation, to submit future 
disputes to arbitration rather than using state-provided adjudication? After 
all, assuming that parties are utility maximizers and cost minimizers, 
adjudication via state mechanisms is subsidized by the government, while 
arbitration is largely self-financed.
In his contribution to the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 
Professor Bruce Benson, an American academic economist, depicted 
commercial arbitration as a cooperative endeavor to minimize the costs of 
dispute resolution.13 Unlike judges, arbitrators tend to specialize in 
particular types of disputes, and parties can select arbitrators based on their 
specialized expertise.14 The advantage of such specialization is that 
arbitrators can render a decision more quickly and with less information 
transferred from the parties to the arbitrator than to a traditional court.15
Additionally, given the arbitrators’ higher levels of expertise, error costs 
13. Bruce L. Benson, Arbitration, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 159, 
161 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).
14. See e.g., Charles H. Brower, The Functions and Limits of Arbitration and Judicial 
Settlement Under Private and Public International Law, 18(2) DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 259, 
264 (2008); Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, The Decision-making Mechanism of the Arbitrator
Vis-à-Vis the Judge, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 167, 168 (2008).
15. Bruce L. Benson, To Arbitrate or To Litigate: That Is the Question, 8 EUR. J. L. &
ECON. 91, 94 (1999).
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may be lower.16 Benson thus maintains that arbitration is less formal than 
adjudicative proceedings and less expensive.17 Robert Cooter and Tom 
Ulen, two celebrated American Law and Economics scholars, also argue 
that arbitration is “much cheaper and less time-consuming than litigation.”18
Moreover, arbitrators and potential arbitrators have incentives to behave 
in ways that correlate to a large extent with the preferences of the 
disputants—or at least of their legal counsel—in relation to, among other 
things, the application of law.19 Another related benefit of arbitration is that
parties usually have veto power in selecting arbitrators, which results in 
stronger incentives for arbitrators to continuously develop their own 
expertise and to render unbiased decisions.20
An important point in that respect is the statistical “exchangeability” of 
arbitrators.21 According to economist Orley Ashenfelter, arbitrators will 
avoid taking extreme positions that may diminish their probability of being 
selected to arbitrate in the future.22 A successful arbitrator will therefore 
write a decision that correctly forecasts (or attempts to forecast) the 
decisions other arbitrators will make in similar situations. That should, in 
theory, lead to the exchangeability of arbitrator decisions necessary to the 
continued acceptability of the arbitration system.23
There are some other advantages of arbitration that are often discussed 
by scholars that may incentivize disputants to arbitrate. First, arbitration is 
generally less adversarial than litigation, allowing disputants to continue 
mutually beneficial commercial relationships.24 Second, arbitral proceedings 
can be kept confidential, minimizing reputational damage to the parties.25
Professor Leon Trakman, a celebrated commercial arbitrator and trade 
adjudicator, believes that the possibility of maintaining “confidentiality is 
key to the successful practice of international commercial arbitration” 
because disputants are thus able to protect their trade secrets and preserve 
16. According to Benson, error costs refer to the costs incurred by the disputing parties 
as a result of an error in judgment (or an arbitral decision in this case). Id.
17. Benson, supra note 13, at 164. In sum, while arbitrator compensation and other 
arbitral costs can be substantially higher than the cost of using the state-subsidized court 
system, parties save money on discovery and development of evidence. 
18. ROBERT COOTER & TOM ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS, 450 (6th ed. 2012).
19. See Anne van Aaken & Tomer Broude, Arbitration from a Law and Economics 
Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Thomas Schultz 
& Federico Ortino eds., forthcoming 2019). 
20. Benson, supra note 13, at 162.
21. See Ashenfelter, supra note 10, at 90.
22. Orley Ashenfelter, Arbitrator Behavior, 77(2) AM. ECON. REV. 342, 343 (1987).
23. Benson, supra note 13, at 186.
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id.
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good business relations.26 Third, parties may avoid the application of state-
made law where they would prefer the application of privately agreed rules, 
including business practice and custom.27
Notwithstanding these advantages of arbitration, the literature also 
suggests potential disadvantages. According to Dr. Robert Kovacs, a well-
known lawyer specializing in international commercial arbitration and ISA 
alike, there are currently substantial barriers to efficiency in international 
arbitration.28 He points, inter alia, to information failures, agency cost 
problems, and dilatory tactics.29 With regard to information failures, Kovacs 
notes that legal counselors may not always have the most adequate 
knowledge or experience in international arbitration and therefore cannot 
always provide accurate advice to the parties involved.30 As far as agency 
costs are concerned, Kovacs refers to an agency relationship between 
lawyers and their clients which creates monitoring costs and bonding 
costs.31 Parties may, moreover, use dilatory tactics, for example by 
extending the process in order to delay the adverse effects that an arbitral 
award may have on their financial records.32
Other concerns include fear that arbitrators may be biased, or that they 
are easily corruptible.33 In arbitral practice, often “each party will appoint an
arbitrator (‘party-appointed arbitrators’) and those party-appointed 
arbitrators will choose the other arbitrator(s).”34 A common party 
appointment model may lead to so-called “affiliation effects,” meaning that 
a party-appointed arbitrator will have an unavoidable tendency to favor the 
party which appointed him.35 In light of the goal of an independent and 
neutral adjudicatory mechanism, the predisposition toward a party resulting 
26. Leon E. Trakman, Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration, 18 
ARB. INT’L 1, 1–2 (2002).
27. Benson, supra note 13, at 164.
28. Robert B. Kovacs, Efficiency in International Arbitration: An Economic Approach,
23 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 155, 160 (2012).
29. Id. at 161–66.
30. Id. at 162.
31. Id. at 162–63. Monitoring costs are incurred by clients who are found to “lack the 
ability to impose significant budget restrictions, compensation policies or coercive power, nor 
the expertise to monitor the work of lawyers.” Id. at 163. In contrast, bonding costs are 
imposed upon lawyers through a retainer agreement and national regulation of legal 
professions. Id.
32. Id. at 166.
33. Benson, supra note 13, at 184.
34. Richard M. Mosk, The Role of Party-Appointed Arbitrators in International 
Arbitration: The Experience of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, 1 TRANSNAT’L LAW.
253, 253 (1988).
35. Van Aaken & Broude, supra note 19, at 15–16.
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from the party appointment model poses significant challenges to the 
legitimacy of arbitration.36
On the other hand, Benson rejects those arguments, as they do not 
sufficiently account for the importance of the arbitrator selection process, 
which is designed precisely to avoid bias.37 Moreover, the competition 
between arbitrators improves arbitrator quality, especially since, in most 
systems, parties can veto particular arbitrators.38 In any case, the use of blind 
appointment, which allows parties to appoint arbitrators but prevents 
appointees from knowing their appointing parties, has been proposed in 
recent years to reduce affiliation bias.39
B.  Incentives of Judges Versus Arbitrators
According to Law and Economics scholarship, arbitrators are more 
incentivized to provide high-quality decisions than judges. This scholarship 
may provide interesting lessons for the design of a potential multilateral 
investment court.
In a few remarkable publications, Richard Posner, a respected Law and 
Economics scholar and a former U.S. judge, has argued that judges are “the 
same as everybody else,” i.e., incentivized to maximize their utility.40 But 
what precisely does utility maximization mean for a judge? Posner argues 
that, like for everyone else, money may play a role, but it is definitely not 
the only component of most judges’ utility functions.41 Judges also derive 
utility from non-pecuniary goods such as leisure and prestige.42 However, 
the problem is that judges do not receive pay raises as a reward for good 
work, and thus they may be less incentivized than arbitrators to deal with 
cases in an efficient manner. Correspondingly, increasing judicial caseloads 
will not lead to judges working harder, as that would mean sacrificing 
leisure, but may instead lead to judges spending less time on each case.43
Consider the goals of members of U.S. Supreme Court. While political 
scientists largely believe that the justices focus chiefly on a single goal, i.e., 
“making the law more consistent with their policy preferences,” Dr. 
Lawrence Baum, a renowned political scientist specializing in the U.S. court 
36. Sergio Puig & Anton Strezhnev, Affiliation Bias in Arbitration: An Experimental 
Approach, 46 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 374 (2017).
37. Benson contends that, although arbitration selection mechanisms demonstrate wide 
variation, they always allow for prescreening of the potential arbitrators. Thus, disputants and 
organizations are able to filter out evidently biased candidates. Benson, supra note 13, at 184–
85.
38. Id.
39. Puig & Strezhnev, supra note 36, at 372.
40. See Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing 
Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2, 39 (1993).
41. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 570 (7th ed. 2007).
42. Id.
43. Id.
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system, argues that a justice may also have other goals to advance; for 
instance, “approval from the public and respect from the legal 
community.”44 In contrast, the problem with the general judiciary, according 
to Posner, is that, especially for judges in the highest courts (who cannot 
receive further promotion), leisure may often be an important driver of their 
decision-making.45 This may even lead judges to base decisions of material 
law on the potential for reduction of their caseload in a bid to strive for 
more leisure. This is an unacceptable adjudicatory practice under certain 
circumstances, such as when done at the cost of procedural integrity and 
substantive justice. This possibility (the prioritization of leisure) is already 
confirmed by some empirical studies.46
Arbitrators clearly want to maximize their own utility as well, but since 
they face more competition than judges, the influence of market pressures 
on their performance may be much stronger.47 Like judges, “[a]rbitrators 
have their own interests which, among other things, can include such factors 
as earning income, enjoying leisure time, providing ‘justice,’ establishing or 
preserving their reputation, advancing their own career and so on.”48 But 
arbitrators will generally make decisions in order to satisfy the preferences 
of existing or potential parties.49
On the other hand, Kovacs also indicates that the arbitration market is 
probably not as competitive as it may appear; there are high barriers to 
market entry.50 Developing a positive reputation to compete as an arbitrator 
may take many years.51 Moreover, risk-averse disputants have a tendency to 
prefer arbitrators with considerable experience and would not want to take 
chances with new players in the market.52 Likewise, Posner and others argue 
that because arbitrators best guarantee future appointments and a constant 
stream of income by placating both sides, they may have a tendency to 
“split the difference” in their award, giving each side a partial victory.53
Such a pattern mitigates claims that arbitrators favor one side or the other 
and could be attractive to risk-averse disputants.54 Posner further argues that 
arbitrators are incentivized to “split the difference” because governments 
44. See Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 
POL. RES. Q. 749, 754–60 (1994).
45. Posner, supra note 41, at 570.
46. See generally, Jef De Mot, Michael Faure & Jonathan Klick, Appellate Caseload 
and the Switch to Comparative Negligence, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 147–56 (2015) 
(discussing this so-called “lazy judges” literature).
47. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23.
48. Kovacs, supra note 28, at 160.
49. Van Aaken & Broude, supra note 19, at 14.
50. Kovacs, supra note 28, at 170.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Posner, supra note 41, at 558.
54. Id. at 559.
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subsidize their courts, leaving arbitrators at a relative disadvantage.55  Since 
they lack state subsidy, they need to provide some other advantage to 
disputants in order to stay in business.56 But this practice is likely to render 
compromise awards that academics link to other forms of cognitive bias.57
Fortunately, Benson provides an overview of empirical evidence showing 
that while some studies support the “split the difference” hypothesis, other 
studies also find substantial variants in arbitration awards.58 He concludes 
that the overall evidence seems to show that arbitrators “do much more than 
split the difference.”59
Thus, the Law and Economics literature informs us that because judges 
do not often derive pecuniary rewards from good work, arbitrators are better 
incentivized to provide for high-quality decision-making due to a higher 
level of market pressures. However, the existing barriers to the efficiency of 
international arbitration and arbitrators’ tendency to “split the difference” 
could undermine the legitimacy of arbitration.
C.  Social Costs of Arbitration
When addressing the Law and Economics of any topic, the first scholars 
to refer to are, on the one hand, William Landes, an American economist 
specializing in the economic analysis of law, and Richard Posner and, on the 
other, Steven Shavell, a Professor of Law and Economics from Harvard 
University. These recognized authorities on Law and Economics have all 
opined briefly on arbitration, Landes and Posner rather negatively, Shavell 
more positively. In a joint 1979 article, Landes and Posner make the simple 
point that arbitration will be sought by the parties in order to benefit their 
own interests, but not necessarily society’s interest.60 They argue that 
adjudication via courts generally creates large and public positive 
externalities, which is one of the reasons why the courts are subsidized by 
the government61: Courts create precedents and provide information on 
issues that are in dispute. In this way, the whole society is very likely to 
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. For example, academics have referred to anchoring and extremeness aversion as 
examples of these cognitive biases. Anchoring means arbitrators are likely to mechanically 
compromise between the disputing parties’ final offers without adequate reference to the facts 
of the case. Extremeness aversion indicates that arbitrators may refuse to grant extreme 
decisions. Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of 
Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 62–63 (2010).
58. Benson, supra note 13, at 181–82.
59. Id. at 182.
60. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 235, 236, 274 (1979).
61. Id. at 241. For a detailed analysis of lawmaking through adjudication, see
Francesco Parisi & Vincy Fon, Lawmaking Through Adjudication, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
LAWMAKING 73–83 (2009).
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reap the benefits of increased clarity in legal norms and their application. In 
contrast, Landes and Posner argue that arbitration under-produces 
precedent. “Because of the difficulty of establishing property rights in a 
precedent, private . . . judges might deliberately avoid explaining their 
results because the demand for their services would be reduced by rules 
that, by clarifying the meaning of the law, reduce the incidents of 
disputes.”62 It is a point Posner makes again in his book Economic Analysis 
of Law, where he writes:
Since the state does not pay any part of the expense of arbitration, 
we should not be surprised that most arbitrators do not write 
opinions. The value of opinions would accrue mainly to people 
other than the parties to the arbitration—people who would not 
contribute to the expenses of the arbitration.63
Although not all authors agree with Landes and Posner on these 
points,64 the discussion already provides an important insight: To the extent 
that investor-state dispute resolution should create external benefits, that 
militates in favor of resolving investor-state disputes via court adjudication 
rather than arbitration. Note that one can relate this argument to the call for 
larger transparency within investor-state dispute resolution. Without 
transparency, it is impossible for dispute resolution mechanisms to create 
these positive externalities.
Shavell, in contrast, discusses why parties would opt for arbitration 
prior to the emergence of a dispute in his 1995 article Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: An Economic Analysis.65 Shavell mentions three advantages of 
arbitration for the parties concerned: (1) it may lower the costs and risks of 
dispute resolution because resort to arbitration is likely to reduce the total 
costs of dispute resolution and to avoid exposure to unreliable jury verdicts; 
(2) it may create better incentives for parties to a contract to perform, thus 
increasing the joint value that the parties’ relationship produces, because of 
the greater accuracy of private dispute resolution,66 and (3) it may reduce the 
number of trials because the lower costs of arbitration should incentivize 
parties to resort to arbitration rather than going to trial.67
62. Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 238–39.
63. Posner, supra note 41, at 558.
64. Inter alia, Benson argues that arbitration may in some circumstances create 
external benefits. See Benson, supra note 15, at 104–05.
65. See Steven Shavell, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Economic Analysis, 24 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1995). For a summary of Shavell’s reasoning, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, 
Judicial Organization and Administration, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS,
supra note 13, at 27.
66. Shavell expects greater accuracy because arbitrators are usually experts in a 
particular field and may therefore be better qualified than judges who generally deal with a 
great many different cases. Shavell, supra note 65, at 9.
67. Id. at 5–7.
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Shavell’s general insight is that Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(“ADR”) systems like arbitration provide clear private benefits to the 
parties and should for that reason be enforced.68 Ex ante, parties themselves 
have much better information about the risks and circumstances of their 
transaction than a court; when they determine that their interests can better 
be served through arbitration, there is reason to enforce their agreement.69
Shavell reprised this reasoning in his well-known Law and Economics 
handbook, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law.70 He argued that if 
parties each separately choose to use the same private dispute resolution 
system, then that system must be making each of them better off—which is 
precisely the reason to enforce it.71 Moreover, if no one else is made worse 
off by the parties’ private agreement, there is no reason for society not to 
enforce the agreement.72 Note that this assumes that only the parties to the 
contract are affected by it,73 a proposition with which Posner and Landes
would probably take umbrage.
It is interesting that the founding fathers of the Law and Economics 
movement apparently diverge on the benefits of arbitration. On the one 
hand, Shavell sees strong advantages, but his argument is based on two 
major assumptions: (1) that the costs of arbitration are lower than those of 
adjudication and (2) that arbitration has no third-party effects.74 Landes and 
Posner, on the other hand, see strong disadvantages related to the fact that 
arbitration does not produce public good in the way that adjudication does. 
Their argument seems to assume that arbitrators lack the incentive to write 
their opinions down in the process of decision-making because arbitration is 
sponsored by private parties instead of public finance.75
D.  Summary
This overview of the differences between arbitration and adjudication 
via the courts, using a Law and Economics approach, provides various 
interesting insights. The main advantage of commercial arbitration is related 
to the potential quality of the arbitrators. Because specialized arbitrators can 
be selected in particular disputes, the disputants expect the quality of the 
decision-making to be superior, leading to reduced costs and faster decision-
making. However, the Law and Economics literature also indicates that both 
judges and arbitrators have decision-making incentives that may not be 
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004).
71. Id. at 446–47.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Shavell, supra note 65, at 5–9.
75. Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 238–39.
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optimal.76 For example, Judges might prefer to maximize their utility 
through leisure when their dockets become full, but they may also be 
incentivized to provide quality decisions for the sake of their reputations. 
On the other hand, arbitrators may have stronger incentives for high-quality 
decision-making as a result of competitive pressure. However, precisely 
because of that competitive pressure—and arbitrators’ desire to be 
guaranteed a stream of income—arbitrators may have a tendency to split the 
difference between the parties instead of always providing a “just” decision.
As far as the social costs of arbitration are concerned, some traditional 
Law and Economics scholars argue that arbitration is not able to generate 
the kinds of large and public positive externalities that are usually attributed 
to adjudication via courts.77 There is little incentive for arbitrators to 
produce precedents, and inconsistent decisions in arbitration could 
potentially destroy the value of a precedential system in any case.78
Overall, Law and Economics scholars have mixed views with respect to 
arbitration. For a variety of reasons, Law and Economics scholarship 
understands why parties often prefer arbitration to adjudication. The private 
benefits of arbitration may be real. At the same time the scholarship also 
indicates that, from a social perspective, there is a substantial disadvantage 
to arbitration: the absence of public good.
III.  The Characteristics of ISA
A large portion of the Law and Economics literature evaluating the 
advantages of arbitration for private parties focuses on commercial 
arbitration. This literature may therefore fail to reflect situational differences 
that are present when a state is involved in the dispute—differences that 
may even cause the social costs of arbitration to increase. We start by 
sketching the emergence and development of ISA and its position in the 
broader picture of investor-state dispute settlement (Section A). Next, we 
explain how the current ISA regime consists of multiple layers of treaties, 
laws, and rules; this implies that any changes to the existing ISA mechanism 
may entail modifications across those layers (Section B). Although ISA is 
modeled after commercial arbitration, we discuss substantial differences 
between ISA and commercial arbitration in Section C and criticisms of and 
reform proposals for the ISA model in Section D.
A.  The Emergence and Development of ISA
Although ISA seems to dominate the discussions of the investment 
treaty regime in the academic community and media, not least due to the 
76. See supra Part II.B.
77. Van Aaken & Broude, supra note 19, at 6.
78. Id.
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publicity of negotiations over high-stakes economic pacts,79 it is a relatively 
new method for resolving investment disputes. The investment treaty 
regime went virtually unnoticed until the early years of this century, in 
striking contrast with other areas of global economic governance.80
Diplomatic channels used to be the main method by which states resolved 
investment disputes.81 But while diplomacy could protect investors in a 
foreign country to a certain extent, its political nature and associated flaws 
meant that it could not meet the growing need for dispute settlement 
between foreign investors and host states that ensued from increasing cross-
border capital flows.82
In the present day, foreign investors are also able to settle disputes 
before national courts within the territory of host states. However, investors 
might be loath to refer their cases to a host state’s judicial branch because of 
inherent drawbacks that could prejudice their odds of securing indemnity. 
Foreign investors are likely to have little confidence in the independence 
and impartiality of domestic courts because the judiciary is inextricably 
associated with national interests. Foreign investors may also feel uneasy 
about the potential “hazards of delay and political pressure” that 
adjudication via national courts could entail.83
The lack of a supranational and accessible forum for entertaining 
disputes that arose from foreign direct investment (“FDI”) invited the 
creation of a new mechanism. While domestic courts are often considered to 
be too biased and partial to properly consider cases from foreign investors, 
international arbitration is thought to provide neutrality.84 The introduction 
79. These eye-catching economic pacts—concluded or not—include, inter alia, the 
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (“CPTPP”), the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (“TTIP”) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (“CETA”). CPTPP and CETA have been concluded and 
ratified. See, e.g., Heng Wang, The Future of Deep Free Trade Agreements: The Convergence 
of TPP (and CPTPP) and CETA?, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 317, 317–42 (2019); Reinhard Quick, 
Why TTIP Should Have an Investment Chapter Including ISDS, 49 J. WORLD TRADE 199,
199–209 (2015). Notably, CETA is one of the initial steps taken by the EU to usher in 
innovative reform of ISA using a standing multilateral investment court. David A. Gantz, The 
CETA Ratification Saga: The Demise of ISDS in EU Trade Agreements?, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
361, 368 (2017).
80. JONATHAN BONNITCHA ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INVESTMENT 
TREATY REGIME 1 (2017).
81. Won-Mog Choi, The Present and Future of the Investor-State Dispute Settlement,
10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 725 (2007).
82. Id. at 727–28.
83. SURYA P. SUBEDI, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: RECONCILING POLICY AND 
PRINCIPLE 32 (2008).
84. Schreuer identifies avoidance of domestic courts as one of the main purposes of the 
ISA system. For further discussions on the perceived deficiencies of court litigation in 
addressing investor-state disputes, see generally Christoph Schreuer, Interaction of 
International Tribunals and Domestic Courts in Investment Law, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS (2010) 71–72
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of the ICSID Convention and its concomitant dispute settlement body in the 
1960s, focusing on the arbitration of investment disputes instead of on the 
substantive protection of foreign investors,85 has effectively filled this gap. 
Under this arbitration system, foreign investors are endowed with standing 
to launch a claim against states at the international level, thereby avoiding 
the need, in many circumstances, to rely on remedies available within a host 
state.86 This investor-state dispute settlement mechanism is unique, though 
not unprecedented in other areas of international law.87 However, for a long 
time, the World Bank’s investment dispute settlement body did not receive 
many requests for arbitration from foreign investors, probably because of 
those investors’ unawareness of the ISA system or the relatively limited 
amount of qualifying FDI flows, or both. The first known treaty-based 
investment claim was brought under the Sri Lanka-UK bilateral investment 
treaty (“BIT”) in 1987 when a British investor alleged damage to its 
investment caused by a military operation by Sri Lankan security forces.88
The entry into the new millennium marked a rapid increase in the use of the 
ISA mechanism, totaling over 900 cases at the time of this writing.89
B.  The Legal Foundations of the ISA Regime
The ISA regime, insofar as investment treaty-based arbitration is 
concerned, is composed of three main legal components. First, the 
(Arthur Rovine ed., 2011). See also Alexandre Gauthier, Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
Mechanisms: What Is Their History and Where Are They Going? 1–2 (Library of Parliament 
(Canada), Publication No. 115-E, 2015), https://lop.parl.ca/staticfiles/PublicWebsite/Home/
ResearchPublications/BackgroundPapers/PDF/2015-115-e.pdf.
85. J. Christopher Thomas & Harpreet Kaur Dhillon, The Foundations of Investment 
Treaty Arbitration: The ICSID Convention, Investment Treaties and the Review of Arbitration 
Awards, 32 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 459, 462 (2017).
86. The typical BIT provides a standing offer to arbitrate through which foreign 
investors are able to resolve covered disputes with the host state in a neutral arbitral forum. 
Richard C. Chen, Bilateral Investment Treaties and Domestic Institutional Reform, 55(3) 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 547, 554 (2017).
87. International human rights law is another area where individuals are given the 
possibility to directly participate in supranational dispute resolution with sovereign states on 
the international plane. However, human rights conventions commonly require individuals to 
exhaust local remedies before making direct claims. To illustrate, article 35 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms stipulates that the 
European Court of Human Rights is ready to entertain private petitions only “after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted.” Choi, supra note 81, at 729–31.
88. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/
87/3 (1990). A breakdown of a large majority of known ISA cases according to the year each 
was initiated is available via the Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator operated by 
UNCTAD. Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, UNCTAD INVESTMENT POLICY HUB, 
https://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
89. Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 391, 392–93 (2012); Investment Dispute Settlement Navigator, supra note 
88.
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protection promised by signatory states to foreign investors and their 
investments is derived from and enforceable through international 
agreements. Second, in the event of an arbitration to enforce that promised 
protection (or to seek compensation for its absence), the procedure of the 
arbitration and the protocol for subsequent enforcement of an award are 
governed by institutional or ad hoc arbitration rules, national arbitral 
legislation, and even an international convention. Third, though the 
decisions and awards issued by prior investment tribunals are not formally 
binding, they are understandably influential to other tribunals applying and 
interpreting similar investment agreements.90
International investment agreements (“IIAs”), like national investment 
law and investor-state contracts, manifest state consent, which is 
indispensable for maintaining the legitimacy of and legal basis for ISA.91 A
large majority of arbitral proceedings before investment tribunals are 
founded upon the dispute resolution sections of IIAs.92 The intricate global 
mesh of IIAs has established a protective network for cross-border investors 
by setting out a range of terms under which signatory states promise 
investors reasonable protection and treatment.93 These terms routinely 
address fair and equitable treatment, national treatment, most favored nation 
treatment, full protection and security, and protection from expropriation.94
National treatment and most favored nation treatment are also collectively 
known as non-discrimination standards that proscribe discrimination on the 
basis of nationality.95
With regard to the procedural rules applicable to ISA, apart from 
ICSID’s Arbitration Rules and Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, other 
arbitration rules—such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the rules 
of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”)—are often available to aggrieved investors 
90. BONNITCHA ET AL., supra note 80, at 3.
91. Michael Waibel, Investment Arbitration: Jurisdiction and Admissibility (U. of 
Cambridge Fac. Of L. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 9, 2014).
92. An international investment agreement is a generic concept employed here to refer 
to various breeds of economic agreements that deal with the protection and/or liberation of 
cross-border investments, including bilateral investment treaties (“BITs”), the investment 
chapters of free trade agreements (“FTAs”) and other sector-specific economic instruments 
such as the Energy Charter Treaty (the “ECT”). Take ICSID arbitration as an example. Parties 
commonly invoke BITs and other treaties as the basis upon which to launch arbitral 
proceedings. Case Databases, ICSID, https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/cases/
AdvancedSearch.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2019). 
93. CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT ARBITRATION :
SUBSTANTIVE PRINCIPLES 30 (2007).
94. Id. at 45.
95. Marcos Orellana, Investment Agreements & Sustainable Development: The Non-
Discrimination Standards, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 3, 3 (2011).
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pursuing non-ICSID arbitrations.96 There are a variety of other procedural 
differences between ICSID and non-ICSID arbitrations.97 While ICSID 
arbitration is a self-contained system in which the recognition and 
enforcement of awards is regulated by the ICSID Convention, non-ICSID 
arbitration sometimes relies on the Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New York Convention”) to 
ensure the recognition and enforcement of the investment awards.98 In 
addition, in comparison to the relative futility of the local law of the 
arbitration situs in relation to the procedure of ICSID arbitration, non-ICSID 
arbitration is subject to the named seat’s local arbitration legislation, thus 
integrating lex loci arbitri.99
Investment arbitrators are charged with stitching together the 
underlying investment agreements and the applicable procedural rules. In 
addition to applying and interpreting IIAs during ISA proceedings, 
arbitrators apply the parties’ chosen arbitration rules to the arbitral process 
to ensure its fairness, integrity, and efficiency. Ultimately, arbitral awards 
document how the arbitral authority has applied and interpreted the 
substantive provisions of IIAs so as to deal with investment disputes.100
Thus, though not formally precedential, investment awards have contributed 
to the dynamics and evolution of the ISA regime; prior investment awards 
are invariably invoked by disputing parties to defend their positions and by 
investment tribunals to support their legal reasoning.101
96. ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 3–5
(2009).
97. Throughout this article, arbitral proceedings that are conducted pursuant to the 
ICSID Arbitration Rules are “ICSID arbitrations,” while proceedings that unfold under other 
arbitration rules, including the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, are dubbed “non-ICSID 
arbitrations.”
98. Articles 53, 54, and 55 of the ICSID Convention prescribe the recognition and 
enforcement of investment awards by domestic courts outside of ICSID arbitration 
proceedings. In contrast to the self-contained recognition and enforcement mechanism in the 
ICSID Convention, investment awards under non-ICSID arbitration (for instance, pursuant to 
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Arbitration 
Rules) rely on the New York Convention for recognition and enforcement. Kamal Huseynli, 
Enforcement of Investment Arbitration Awards: Problems and Solutions, 3 BAKU ST. U.L.
REV. 40, 42 (2017).
99. See, e.g., Wick, supra note 5, at 275–76.
100. Kathryn Gordon & Joachim Pohl, Investment Treaties over Time—Treaty Practice 
and Interpretation in a Changing World 13 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2, 
2015), http://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/WP-2015-02.pdf.
101. Dolores Bentolila, Towards a Doctrine of Jurisprudence in Treaty-Based 
Investment Arbitration 8–15, https://edisciplinas.usp.br/pluginfile.php/301823/mod_resource/
content/0/DOLORES%20BENTOLILA%20-%20Towards%20a%20Doctrine%20of%
20Jurisprudence%20in%20Treaty-Based%20Investment%20Arbitration%20.pdf. Notably, 
there is no formal or binding precedent system within the ISA regime that confines arbitrators 
to existing arbitral jurisprudence. Id. Nevertheless, Cheng and Grisel have respectively 
articulated that previous arbitral awards tend to come into play in the arbitration of investment 
awards, even though the arbitral authority is not legally bound to account for the application 
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C.  Investment Arbitration Versus Commercial Arbitration
The emergence of international arbitration in part flows from the biases 
perceived by the business community in relation to litigation before national 
courts. The essential idea of international arbitration is to mitigate these 
biases by submitting a dispute between or among conflicting parties to an 
unbiased tribunal (or individual) in the hope that a binding arbitral award 
will be delivered through a process that is different from a court’s procedure 
and formalities.102 That concept also brings the two branches of 
arbitration—ISA and international commercial arbitration—into close 
proximity.
Because international commercial arbitration predates ISA, the current 
ISA regime drew inspiration from the procedures used in international 
commercial arbitration.103 As a result, ISA shares commonalities with 
commercial arbitration, including “the number and selection of arbitrators, 
the presentation of evidence, the conduct of hearings, and the awards.”104
This relationship is further enhanced by the reliance of some non-ICSID 
arbitrations on procedural rules that are overwhelmingly used in commercial 
arbitration.105
However, ISA and commercial arbitration diverge significantly in 
important areas despite these similarities.106 Dr. Lars Markert, a legal 
counselor with expertise in both commercial arbitration and ISA, points to a 
few of ISA’s differentiating characteristics, all of which are interrelated and 
have important consequences for the interpretation of the notion of 
efficiency in international arbitration.107 The first major difference is that the 
mere involvement of the state may decrease the speed at which investor-
state disputes are resolved.108 Second, arbitral scrutiny over regulatory 
measures may adversely affect the interests of the respondent state’s 
and interpretation of norms and rules by prior tribunals. Tai-Heng Cheng, Precedent and 
Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1014, 1016 (2006); Florian 
Grisel, Precedent in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Compound Interest, 2 PKU
TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 216, 226 (2014). 
102. S.I. Strong, Essay, Border Skirmishes: The Intersection Between Litigation and 
International Commercial Arbitration, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 1–2 (2012).
103. Gary Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 
834–35 (2012).
104. Id.
105. The UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, for instance, not only find their place in 
international commercial arbitration, but also play their part in ISA. Norbert Horn, Current 
Use of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in the Context of Investment Arbitration, 24 ARB.
INT’L 587, 588 (2008). 
106. Lauren Willis, Book Note, International Investment and Commercial Arbitration: 
An Industry Perspective, 3 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 542, 542 (2011).
107. Lars A. Markert, Improving Efficiency in Investment Arbitration, 4 CONTEMP. ASIA 
ARB. J. 215, 220 (2011).
108. Id.
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citizenry.109 Third, the public interest involved may favor more transparent 
proceedings.110 Fourth, and consequently, there may be demand for 
publication of the arbitral award.111 Fifth, since a greater public interest is at 
stake, the tribunal should not only take into account the interests of the 
parties, but also the broader public interest involved, which may also lead to 
less party autonomy in the procedure.112 Likewise, the public interest 
involved could imply that a higher investment of time and cost is  justified 
than in international commercial arbitration.113 These differences should be 
taken into consideration by stakeholders in an effort to bring about either a 
moderate reform or an overhaul of the present design of ISA.
Anathea Roberts, an American Professor with extensive scholarship on 
the topic of investment arbitration, has argued that the ISA regime “grafts 
public international law (as a matter of substance) onto international 
commercial arbitration (as a matter of procedure).”114 This idea sheds light 
on additional differences between ISA and commercial arbitration: the 
unique need for arbitrators in investor-state disputes to understand and 
interpret public international law, and the divergent legal frameworks that 
respectively uphold the two forms of arbitration.
In commercial arbitration, the only noteworthy international instrument 
is the New York Convention, which was framed to promote the use of 
arbitration and reinforce the authority of the arbitral system.115 Instead, 
national law seems to feature more prominently in commercial arbitration 
than in ISA.116 Lex loci arbitri are meant to govern the procedural aspects of 
commercial arbitration, paralleling national substantive laws that might 
apply to a dispute’s merits.117
In contrast, international instruments feature prominently throughout all 
ISA proceedings.118 For example, tribunals are often called upon to apply 
the ICSID Convention itself or the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (which might be invoked by investment tribunals for the purpose of 
109. Id. Many claims filed by aggrieved investors have been targeted at government 
policies that promote public interests and have thus hindered the ability of host states, 
especially developing countries, to regulate to raise their standards of living. Kevin P. 
Gallagher & Elen Shrestha, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Developing Countries: A Re-
Appraisal, 12 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 919, 919 (2011).
110. Markert, supra note 107, at 220.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 221.
113. Id.
114. Anthea Roberts, Divergence Between Investment and Commercial Arbitration, 106 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 297, 297 (2012). 
115. Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different 
Are They Today? The Lalive Lecture 2012, 28 ARB. INT’L 577, 579 (2012). 
116. Id. at 579–80.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 579.
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treaty interpretation),119 and the controversies at issue in ISA proceedings 
are often alleged breaches of the host states’ treaty obligations under IIAs. 
Though national law can be relevant to the resolution of investment 
disputes,120 ICSID arbitration procedures are not anchored to a particular 
national arbitral regime. (Non-ICSID arbitration has much closer procedural 
connections to national arbitral legislation.121)
The different role of public international law in ISA also requires a 
different scope of expertise among the arbitrators themselves. Roberts 
claims that ISA brings together professionals from the fields of inter-state 
dispute resolution and private commercial arbitration.122 But a different level 
of expertise is expected from arbitrators who handle investment disputes 
and those who do commercial arbitration. Whereas the wide reach of 
commerce determines that commercial arbitrators are supposed to have 
knowledge and experience in a special field,123 investment arbitrators have 
to be knowledgeable of something much broader—public international 
law—so that they can apply the investment protection provisions of IIAs in 
a law-abiding and reasonable way.124 Jurisdictionally, ISA involves more 
controversial issues and a much higher frequency of objections.125 These 
differences also lead to more frequent demands for transparency, 
predictability and consistency in ISA proceedings than commercial 
arbitration.126
D.  Criticisms and Reform of ISA
The ISA system has been under serious attack from a variety of parties 
since 2007, culminating in the “legitimacy crisis” that has become the topic 
of considerable attention from—and heated debate among—legal scholars 
and practitioners.127 Criticisms include, first, the claim by states and some 
119. Ali Moghaddam Abrishami, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration by J. 
Romesh Weeramantry, 29 ARB. INT’L 549, 549 (2013) (book review).
120. Article 42(1) of the ICSID Convention provides that in case of a default in an 
agreement between the disputing parties, investment tribunals shall apply the law of the 
Contracting State party to the dispute and the rules of international law as may be applicable. 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 42(1), Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
121. Böckstiegel, supra note 115, at 580.
122. Roberts, supra note 114, at 297–98.
123. Böckstiegel, supra note 115, at 581.
124. Id. at 581–82.
125. Id. at 583. For instance, the host state’s consent to arbitration may depend on: (1) 
whether an “investment” existed; (2) whether the claimant is a national of the alleged home 
state; or (3) whether the claimant really owns and/or controls the expropriated assets in the 
host state. Id.
126. Böckstiegel, supra note 115, at 586–89.
127. David P. Riesenberg, Note, Fee-Shifting in Investor-State Arbitration: Doctrine 
and Policy Justifying Application of the English Rule, 60 DUKE L.J. 977, 986–87 (2011). 
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scholars that the ISA system has a pro-investor bias and puts states in a 
disadvantaged position.128 Although the pro-investor bias in ISA is difficult 
to prove or disprove, the perception of such a bias is pervasive.129 The 
perception seems to stem from a series of underlying concerns about the 
investment treaty regime in general and the ISA system in particular. These 
include: (1) The belief of some scholars that the current international 
investment law regime is lopsided, with extremely unequal terms of 
agreement imposed on developing countries by their stronger BIT 
partners.130 (2) The dissatisfaction of some states with the wide interpretive 
authority of investment tribunals, which results from the usually vague and 
open-ended BIT language.131 (3) General allegations that the outcomes of 
the ISA proceedings are biased in favor of investors.132
Second, developing states argue that the ICSID system particularly 
favors investors from the developed world and disadvantages developing 
states, biased in favor of the Global North.133 Third, and similarly, many also 
consider the ISA system to be elitist: Arbitrators are usually white, male, 
and from the developed North.134 They are often involved in so-called 
“revolving doors” with a handful of leading law firms always representing 
the cases.135 Fourth, contrary to theoretical assumptions about arbitration 
generally, ISA has become very costly and the procedures quite lengthy.136
Fifth, because of state involvement in ISA, there is a growing sentiment that 
proceedings should better account for public interests than commercial 
arbitration, which emphasizes the private interests of investors.137 Sixth, an 
even more prevalent meme among critics of investment arbitration is that
the rising number of investment claims and the considerable costs of the 
128. See ICSID in Crisis, supra note 5.
129. Riesenberg, supra note 127, at 987.
130. See Olivia Chung, Note, The Lopsided International Investment Law Regime and 
Its Effect on the Future of Investor-State Arbitration, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 953, 962 (2007).
131. Alison Giest, Comment, Interpreting Public Interest Provisions in International 
Investment Treaties, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 321, 330 (2017).
132. Riesenberg, supra note 127, at 988.
133. See generally Brower & Blanchard, supra note 6; Franck, supra note 6.
134. See Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from Injustice: How Law Firms, 
Arbitrators and Financiers Are Fueling an Investment Arbitration Boom, TRANSNAT’L INST.
& CORP. EUR. OBSERVATORY, at 36 (Nov. 2012), https://www.tni.org/files/download/
profitingfrominjustice.pdf.
135. Id.
136. See Matthew Hodgson & Alastair Campbell, Investment Treaty Arbitration: Cost, 
Duration and Size of Claims All Show Steady Increase, INT’L J. COM. & TREATY ARB. NEWS 
(Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Investment-Treaty-
Arbitration-cost-duration-and-size-of-claims-all-show-steady-increase.aspx.
137. See Alessandra Arcuri & Francesco Montanaro, Justice for All: Protecting the 
Public Interest in Investment Treaties, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2791, 2804 (2018).
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arbitral process will lead to “regulatory chill.”138 This refers to the allegation 
that nation states will not optimally regulate international investors due to 
fears of having to be the respondent state in investment arbitration.139 (7) 
Finally, given the perception that states’ right to regulate is threatened by 
ISA, some scholars believe national sovereignty is also diminished.140
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”), in its World Investment Report 2015, also summarized the 
major concerns surrounding the ISA regime. It characterized these concerns 
as including
that the current mechanism exposes host States to additional legal 
and financial risks, often unforeseen at point of entering into the 
IIA and in circumstances beyond clear-cut infringements on private 
property, without necessarily bringing any benefits in terms of 
additional FDI flows; that it grants foreign investors more rights as 
regards dispute settlement than domestic investors; that it can 
create the risk of a “regulatory chill” on legitimate government 
policymaking; that it results in inconsistent arbitral awards; and that 
it is insufficient in terms of ensuring transparency, selecting 
independent arbitrators, and guaranteeing due process.141
These criticisms have been repeated not only by scholars, but also in 
various policy documents advocating reform proposals. Some of these 
reform proposals, such as those launched by the EU, suggest replacing the 
ISA system with a permanent investment court.142 Other scholars argue for 
less radical reforms, making specific modifications to the current ISA 
system.143
For instance, a study concerning the costs of arbitration by Susan 
Franck, an expert in empirical analysis of international law, points to the 
importance of providing more clarity, certainty, and transparency 
138. Arseni Matveev, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Evolving Balance Between 
Investor Protection and Sovereignty, 40 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 348, 358 (2015).
139. Vera Korzun, The Right to Regulate in Investor-State Arbitration: Slicing and 
Dicing Regulatory Carve-Outs, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 355, 383 (2017). Modern IIAs 
provide foreign investors with relief not only in case of direct expropriations but also for 
indirect expropriations. Since the most prevalent form of interference with foreign property 
rights today is regulatory, an apparent conflict has arisen between the regulatory interests of 
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concerning arbitration’s costs to the parties.144 In a subsequent paper on the 
“ICSID Effect,” she points to the importance of providing correct 
information to the parties involved in investor-state arbitration in order to 
correct any misperceptions they might hold concerning biases in arbitration, 
including but not limited to the widely-circulated view that the ICSID 
system is inherently biased in favor of investors.145 She also advocates for 
new modalities of ADR, some even within the context of ICSID.146
Ultimately, she argues that the international community must show that 
ICSID can “be a model of fairness, efficiency and justice in the field of 
international economic dispute resolution.”147
Kovacs also indicates ways to increase the efficiency of international 
arbitration.148 He points to a variety of measures, such as choosing the best 
arbitrators for the dispute by focusing on their skills, ability to manage the 
process efficiently, and the time that they are willing to devote to 
arbitration; providing more information to parties about alternative arbitral 
procedures; and reducing lawyers’ moral hazard through the proactive 
involvement of the parties in the dispute resolution process.149 One example 
of lawyers’ moral hazard is that, depending on their billing method, they 
may have incentives to apply dilatory tactics in a bid to delay the procedure 
for more billable hours.150 Consequently, Kovacs suggests reforming arbitral 
pricing models to systemically punish parties who cause delays by forcing 
them to internalize the costs of their delay.151
Markert also has a variety of suggestions to improve the efficiency of 
ICSID.152 For example, he recommends dismissing claims for a clear lack of 
legal merit earlier in the arbitral process.153 He also proposes adopting the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which leave the parties with more flexibility 
for amendment to achieve their efficiency goals compared to the ICSID 
system,154 and resolving smaller cases with a sole arbitrator instead of a 
144. Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH.
U. L. REV. 769, 769–70, 852 (2011).
145. Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in 
Arbitration Awards, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 825, 909 (2011).
146. Apart from arbitration, ICSID also provides other methods of dispute resolution. 
These other methods are only sporadically used in this context but could lead to substantial 
cost and time savings. Id. at 912. Franck suggests that ICSID might launch initiatives to 
develop programs relating to “early neutral evaluation or mediation.” To achieve this goal, 
“ICSID or other professional bodies could offer mediation guidelines or mediation-related 
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153. Id. at 230–36.
154. Id. at 237–40.
Spring 2020] Investor-State Arbitration 23
tribunal.155 Like Kovacs, Markert suggests that cost-allocation can be an 
incentive for more efficient party behavior:156 Equal cost-splitting does not 
necessarily provide parties with the correct incentives; allocating costs 
against a party who raises unfounded objections may be better.157 This also 
aligns with the suggestions made by Thomas Webster, a preeminent 
Canadian arbitrator, to discourage unmeritorious claims via an award of 
costs.158
With regard to the improvement of the selection procedures of 
investment arbitrators, Professor Chiara Giorgetti, whose expertise includes 
international arbitration, puts forward a few concrete recommendations in 
order to preserve the integrity of the arbitral process and increase the 
diversity of investment arbitrators.159 Her first proposal is to change the 
ICSID rules for challenges made by disputants against investment 
arbitrators because the existing challenge procedures are deficient both 
procedurally and substantively.160 Giorgetti regards having unchallenged 
arbitrators decide a challenge to a fellow tribunalist, according to the ICSID 
procedure, as improper because that decision would put the remaining 
arbitrators in a difficult and uneasy situation, especially since they would be 
aware that they will probably have to maintain professional relations with 
the challenged arbitrator.161 She further argues that the ICSID Convention’s 
standard of review in relation to the disqualification of an arbitrator, which 
is a “manifest lack of the qualities” required to be nominated, is too strict.162
These two factors result in a threshold for a successful challenge to the 
ICSID system that is very hard to meet and ineffective.163 As a result, the 
current ICSID challenge procedure fails to address concerns that might lead 
to challenge, like party-appointed arbitrators who are excessively inclined to 
favor their appointing parties.164
Giorgetti seems to be more sympathetic to the corresponding procedure 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, where the appointing authority, 
instead of the remaining arbitrators, are usually called to decide upon an 
arbitrator’s challenge.165 Moreover, she suggests that the International Bar 
Association’s Guidelines on Conflict of Interests in International Arbitration 
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should guide investment tribunals operated under both the ICSID and the 
UNCITRAL rules.166
To increase the diversity of investment arbitrators, Giorgetti argues that 
appointing authorities, secretariats, and disputants should all contribute.167
First, appointing authorities should choose diverse candidates when 
selecting presiding or co-arbitrators or members of ad hoc annulment 
committees.168 Second, the Chairman of the ICSID Administrative Council 
has the chance to directly contribute to the diversity of investment 
arbitrators since he or she is entitled to select ten of the Panel of 
Arbitrators.169 Third, ICSID’s Secretary-General should urge ICSID 
Contracting States to take into consideration diversity when they nominate 
members to the Panel of Arbitrators.170 Fourth, the Secretariats of ICSID and 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration may, via developing a best-practice 
policy, encourage disputing parties to consider the promotion of diversity 
when they appoint their arbitrators.171 Last, a related suggestion is that 
disputing parties may be more sensitive to diversity of investment 
arbitrators if data on the lack of diversity is publicized.172
E.  Summary
This overview shows that ISA emerged as a system to resolve 
investment disputes between investors and states in the 1960s, largely 
modeled on the example of commercial arbitration. Most investor-state 
dispute resolution now takes place via ICSID, although investment 
arbitration also takes place in non-ICSID forums.173 States can consent to 
arbitration in a variety of legal instruments, but the most common and 
important in practice are IIAs.174 Even though investment arbitration was 
modeled on commercial arbitration, the involvement of the state 
differentiates ISA from commercial arbitration; consequently, that model 
may not be perfectly fit to deal with disputes between investors and states.175
166. Id. at 480.
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Because the state is involved, public interest requires more transparency and 
less autonomy for the parties as compared to commercial arbitration.
The fact that these investment disputes are now largely dealt with via 
arbitration has led to substantial criticism concerning the way in which the 
system operates, both in regard to biases against developing states and the 
high costs and inefficiency of the mechanism.176 But to what extent are these 
criticisms substantiated by empirical research? Which reform proposals are 
the most grounded in the data? This will be addressed in Part V.
IV.  Empirics of ISA Generally
We now turn to the rich empirical literature on ISA. We start by 
presenting the general findings on how this system is used. In Part V, we 
will more profoundly analyze to what extent this empirical evidence 
supports some of the criticisms against the current ISA system.
Here, we first stress the importance of empirical evidence (Section A) 
and then analyze the evidence on arbitration filings (Section B). Next, we 
assess the claims made in ISA, as well as the awards rendered by investment 
tribunals (Section C). The final Section (Section D) summarizes the findings 
of this Part.
A.  Importance and Limits of Empirical Evidence
From the discussion so far, it is clear that the theoretical Law and 
Economics literature takes a relatively positive view of arbitration; at the 
least, the literature understands why parties may have a strong preference 
for arbitration. It can lead to speedy and cheap dispute resolution by 
arbitrators who have large expertise in specialized domains. Arbitration can 
also be kept secret, which may have advantages for business parties. But 
these advantages, present in international commercial arbitration, may not 
transfer to investor-state arbitration where public interests are involved. At 
the same time, the criticisms of arbitration offered by the theoretical Law 
and Economics literature—particularly with regard to arbitration’s lack of 
transparency and the risk that it consequently may not generate the positive 
externalities usually associated with adjudication—do appear to apply to 
investor-state arbitration.
At this point, it is important to incorporate empirical data into the 
analysis of ISA as a whole. Academic Law and Economics ideas of how 
investor-state arbitration functions are not necessarily supported by the 
realities of the mechanism. In this regard, empirical studies are capable of, 
at least theoretically, offering a more solid foundation for the evaluation of 
the functioning of ISA.177
176. See supra Part III.D.
177. Catherine Rogers, The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators, 12 SANTA 
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However, it is worth noting that empirical studies are not a panacea. 
Catherine Rogers, a scholar of international arbitration and professional 
ethics, cautions of the risk that empirical evidence will be misused in the 
highly politicized field of investment arbitration.178 Thus, despite 
recognizing the value of empirical studies for analyzing investment 
arbitration, she suggests that due care should be accorded in the process of 
reading, interpreting, and adopting those empirics.179
In a critique of Rogers’s article, Giorgetti echoed the ideas therein by 
arguing that empirical studies are of constructive significance in 
illuminating the legitimacy crisis facing investment arbitration, but that 
empirics have intrinsic weaknesses that should give scholars concern.180
First, the most essential variable—the “correct” legal outcome in a 
particular case—is often overlooked by the data used in empirical studies of 
ISA.181 Second, empirical reviews of international arbitration tend to easily 
confuse a finding of correlation with a finding of causation.182 Third, 
empirical researchers may misuse data if they predetermine the outcomes of 
the questions asked.183 Fourth, results can be over-simplified because 
empirical researchers may be tempted to emphasize the outcomes of cases 
while overlooking the arbitrators’ content analysis.184 Still, where done 
properly (when “a question that can only have a yes/no answer is posited 
and objective criteria are evaluated”), Giorgetti concludes that these studies 
can be useful.185
As a scholar who focuses on the interdisciplinary research of 
international courts and tribunals, Daniel Behn expresses a concern that 
empirical research on ISA is out-of-date, given the upsurge of arbitral 
decisions in recent years.186 Behn, in his paper, highlights the problems in
relation to evidence-based research in ISA: Though the transparency and 
public availability of investment awards have improved, they continue to 
pose challenges for empirical research in this field.187 While much empirical 
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research remains to be done, Behn raises the concern that few scholars 
currently conducting empirically-based research are interested in evaluating 
investment arbitration.188
Some exceptions do exist: The research project PluriCourts at Oslo 
University aspires to conduct a long-term empirical study on investment 
arbitration.189 Likewise, Professor Sergio Puig is attempting to raise 
awareness among scholars of the importance of conducting empirical 
research on ISA.190 By deconstructing ICSID’s goals, he hopes to enable 
interested empirical scholars to cast the legitimacy debate of ICSID “as one 
more amenable to empirical evaluations.”191 As discussed below, we hope 
that this paper will inspire more ISA-focused empirical research.
B.  Arbitration Filing
Various studies have addressed the basic questions of who is using ISA, 
against whom, for what particular reasons, and in what types of cases.192
Although this data does not directly address some of the criticisms of the 
ISA system, it is relevant to the extent it shows, for example, that more 
plaintiffs come from the developed North and  more defendants from the 
Global South. Although that data alone does not conclusively demonstrate 
bias in the system, it could shed light on why some states have the 
impression of being systematically attacked via the ISA system.
Behn studied 147 fully and partially solved ISA cases from September 
2011 to September 2014, assessing whether the ISA regime has evolved and 
the extent to which empirical evidence supports the legitimacy critiques 
lodged against ISA.193 Behn argues that, although the cases are somewhat 
diverse in terms of the types of cases being brought, the limited degree of 
diversity could raise questions of legitimacy.194 During the period Behn 
studied, the ISA caseload was dominated by particular economic sectors, 
including extractive industries and electric power.195 A large number of 
cases were brought against less developed countries and regions, notably in 
Latin America, Eastern Europe and Central Asia.196 By contrast, plaintiffs 
were largely corporations from developed countries, especially from 
188. Id. at 414–15.
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Western Europe and North America.197 In total, 76% percent of all cases in 
the dataset involved claimants from developed states litigating against 
emerging economies or developing states.198 Behn argues that diversification 
of claims away from this pattern—achieved by reaching out to small-scale 
investors and investors from developing states on the claimant side, and by 
integrating developed states and geographically diverse states on the 
respondent side—could benefit ISA legitimacy.199
In another paper purporting to improve the existing literature,200 Rachel 
Wellhausen, an associate professor of government whose research interests 
include international investment law, conducted an empirical study on ISA 
cases.201 By exploring data on ISA cases from 1990 to 2014, she documents 
the recent trends of ISA practice through a political science lens, as the 
questions discussed there are believed to have political implications.202 She 
finds that, while a large number of cases are focused on industries with 
“immobile assets” such as utilities, oil, and gas, investors from the services 
and manufacturing sectors also filed a wealth of arbitration cases against 
host states.203 Her study shows that though investors from as many as 
seventy-three home states have filed ISA claims, 87% of cases involved 
investors from just fifteen states.204 Many of those investors were from 
developed states.205
The study also paints a picture of respondent states involved in ISA 
cases. Two Latin American countries, Argentina and Venezuela, topped the 
ranking.206 Other frequently sued countries include the Czech Republic, 
Mexico, Ecuador, Canada, Egypt, Poland, Ukraine and the United States.207
Notably, Wellhausen predicts that as more IIAs are signed between 
developed countries Northern countries will be increasingly targeted by 
complaints.208
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Professors Schultz and Dupont also conducted quantitative empirical 
research on ISA cases, examining over 500 cases between 1972 and 2010.209
Their study sought not only to develop a factual perspective on ISA, but 
also to evaluate three criticisms through data analysis.210 The first criticism
of ISA they examine is that the process is functionally neo-colonialism.211
Their data shows that until the mid-to-late 1990s, investment arbitration 
mostly followed the pattern of “rich vs poor” and “developed vs 
developing,” seemingly confirming arguments about neo-colonialism in that 
stretch of time.212 However, since the mid-to-late 1990s, investors from 
developed states have started to sue developed host states with ever higher 
frequency, even exceeding the number of “developed vs developing” 
cases.213 Based on this comparison, Schultz and Dupont conclude that the 
most recent data contradicts the common argument that ISA is a form of 
neo-colonization.214
The second perception of ISA their study examines is whether ISA 
substitutes for “the rule of law in the host state,” or, in other words, whether 
it replaces “dysfunctional courts” and “unreliable countries.”215 By reference 
to the Polity IV index—as a proxy for states’ level of democratic 
development—and states’ ICRG Law and Order scores, they find that 
before the mid-to-late 1990s the average annual polity scores and average 
annual law and order scores of respondent states were quite low, offering 
some support for the idea that investment arbitration is a substitution for 
lack of rule of law in certain countries.216 However, this idea is not as 
plausible when data derived since the mid-1990s are considered, as 
countries with a higher democratic level and better respect for the rule of 
law were sued at international tribunals with even higher frequency.217 The 
paper also observes that as a consequence of the imbalanced distribution of 
claims,218 it remains plausible that certain arbitration regimes can substitute 
for domestic rule of law.219
In addition, Professors Van Aaken and Broude have demonstrated that 
ISA has a heavy bias toward the nominating party (the investor) in terms of 
cost allocation.220 Correspondingly, they argue that arbitrators may have a 
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structural incentive to grant jurisdiction, in order to guarantee a continued 
stream of income from the case.221 This claim is supported by an earlier 
empirical study by Kathleen McArthur (a legal counselor) and Pablo 
Ormachea (an in-house counsel) on the factors that influence jurisdictional 
rulings issued by ICSID tribunals.222 In the 79 cases this study covered, 
ICSID tribunals decided jurisdictional issues in favor of investors (i.e.
granted jurisdiction) nearly 85 percent of the time.223 That research therefore 
suggests that arbitrators certainly have their own interests and decide 
accordingly, in an attempt to maximize income.
C.  Claims and Awards
Another window into the operation of ISA is comparing the 
compensation claimed by foreign investors and the actual awards of 
investment tribunals, which provide important information about the size 
and significance of investment arbitration cases. This dimension is highly 
amenable to empirical quantitative study, and it has unsurprisingly attracted 
substantial scholarship from those that are keen to sketch out ISA 
empirically.
Wellhausen, for instance, examined the monetary expectations of 
foreign investors (in terms of the claims they asserted) and the pecuniary 
outcomes of arbitral proceedings (in terms of the awards parties received), 
as well as the contrasts between the two.224 Data on compensation claims 
can be difficult to find, but, in the 325 cases she examined, both from court 
documents and news sources, claims range from tens of thousands to 
billions of U.S. dollars.225 The average claim demanded by investors was 
$884 million USD, though this was driven largely by the dozens of
investment arbitrations in which the claimants demanded one billion U.S. 
dollars.226
By contrast, the compensation awarded by investment tribunals in 119 
publicly available cases averaged $508 million USD, inflated once again by 
a small number of large awards. In the eighty-six instances in which (1) the 
investor won and (2) both the compensation sought and the compensation 
awarded is available, Wellhausen found that in half of all rulings investors 
won less than 33% of their original claims. The average award was just 40% 
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of the original claim. Notably, there are only six instances in which the 
investor won the full amount of the original claim (or more).227
Matthew Hodgson and Alastair Campbell, both legal counselors with 
specialization in international arbitration, have also produced a number of 
influential empirical studies on damages and costs in arbitration that largely 
corroborate Wellhausen’s findings. Hodgson published his first empirical 
study on damages and costs in investment treaty arbitration in 2014, 
covering some 221 cases for which an award or decision was available from 
the 1980s through the end of 2012.228 Hodgson and Campbell published an 
update in 2017, gathering data on an additional 140 awards published since 
the end of 2012.229 The contrast between the two datasets not only 
illuminates the specific operation of ISA, but demonstrates the evolution of 
the dispute settlement regime in that relatively short stretch of time. They 
show that the mean amount claimed by investors has risen from $491 
million USD in the first study to around $1.1 billion USD in the 
second.230The second study also reveals a significant rise in the mean 
amount of compensation awarded to successful claimants.231 It skyrocketed 
from $76.3 million USD in 2012 to $1.08 billion USD from 2013 to 2017.232
The second study also highlights that the mean amount awarded continues 
to decline relative to the mean amount claimed (from 40% to 32%), 
indicating that the claimants continue to overvalue either their investments 
or the damage they incurred.233 Interestingly, the mean amount pursued in 
claims that are ultimately successful is manifestly lower than that in failed 
claims.234 Noting this discrepancy, Hodgson and Campbell argue that 
“flawed claims continue to drive up the average amount claimed.”235
Separately, a study by Gus Van Harten, a professor of law with 
expertise in international investment law, and Pavel Malysheusk, a 
corporate lawyer, examined who receives monetary awards from investment 
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tribunals and who benefits the most from financial transfers due to ISA.236
One of the questions they addressed is whether the ISA system only benefits 
multinational enterprises and wealthy individuals or also small and medium-
sized enterprises.237 They collected data on known ISA cases (with a focus 
on cases resulting in monetary awards for investors) and then linked the 
amounts of awarded compensation to the size and wealth of the claimants. 
Their research demonstrates that, in financial terms, the overwhelming 
beneficiaries of ISA are large companies (those with annual revenue of over 
$1 billion USD), extra-large companies (those with annual revenue of over 
$10 billion USD), and individuals with a net worth of over $100 million 
USD.238 Ninety-four and a half percent of the aggregate compensation 
(93.5% if pre-award interest is included) went to these ultra-rich companies 
and individuals,239 while the remaining 5.5% (or 6.5%) was shared by 
companies with annual revenue of less than $1 billion USD, unknown 
companies, and not-so-wealthy individuals.240
An incidental finding of this research is that extra-large companies 
appeared to have a much higher success rate (82.9% over 41 cases) than 
other claimants (57.9% over 121 cases) at the merits stage.241 Despite the 
caveat that “[o]ne should approach all of the numbers presented here as 
approximate and keep in mind that variations in the experiences of different 
actors may be coincidental,”242 this disparity in success rates between extra-
large companies and others points to the possibility that the economic power 
of the claimant may sway the ultimate outcome of investor-state 
proceedings. How that correlation exactly works could not be examined in 
the study.243 One could speculate, however, that economically powerful 
claimants may be able to spend more to research their claims, secure 
excellent counsel, and select well-paid arbitrators who might be favorable to 
their case.
D.  Summary
Already, this overview of empirical studies provides a few interesting 
insights for the debate over ISA. One important point is that in most 
investor-state arbitration cases investors from developed countries (the 
North) bring cases against states in the developing world (the South). 
However, the claimant-respondent pattern has seen changes in more recent 
years with more developed countries being targeted by foreign investors as 
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237. Id. at 1.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1–2.
241. Id. at 2, 9.
242. Id. at 2.
243. Id. at 1–18.
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well. The empirical evidence also shows that investors’ overall claim 
amounts are increasing, which understandably alarms developing countries 
with limited budgets.244 Though claim amounts are increasing, the research 
suggests that investors may be overestimating either the value of their own 
investments or of the losses they have suffered, as the ratio of the amounts 
awarded compared to the amounts claimed is decreasing.245
Another interesting conclusion is the relative success of wealthy 
plaintiffs.246 The economic power of the claimant seems to be a significant 
factor as far as the amount of compensation awarded and the success rate of 
a claim are concerned.247 Yet, so far there has been no empirical research 
examining a possible relationship between the level of the investments and 
the increase in the amounts claimed, which might correlate an increase in 
the amounts claimed in ISA to the investors’ level of foreign investment.
Although these numbers explain the negative sentiments in developing 
countries against the ISA system, they do not provide objective and clear 
evidence of a bias against those countries in the way the cases are decided. 
That requires a further analysis of some other empirical studies conducted 
by scholars.
V.  Empirics Supporting the Criticism of ISA
As indicated in this article’s introduction, the question arises whether 
the investment arbitration system as it currently functions is as neutral as its’ 
theorists expect. Countries in the developing world (like India and some 
Latin American countries) look with suspicion at the international 
investment arbitration system.248 Some of these countries claim that the 
system is dominated by the Western world and does not provide the 
neutrality and impartiality which it is supposed to have.249 Moreover, the 
reasons that provide theoretical support for arbitration—that it resolves 
disputes more cheaply and quickly than traditional litigation—do not always 
apply to the ISA system due to the excessive costs involved.250
Consequently, critics argue that ISA may no longer generate relative 
advantages over national litigation.251
244. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 229; Sonia E. Rolland, The Return of State 
Remedies in Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Trends in Developing Countries, 49 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 387, 390 (2017).
245. Id.
246. Van Harten & Malysheuski, supra note 12, at 2, 9.
247. Id. at 1–2, 9.
248. Trakman, supra note 7, at 604–05.
249. Id.
250. Jonathan Klett, Comment, National Interest vs. Foreign Investment—Protecting 
Parties Through ISDS, 25 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 213, 225 (2016).
251. See supra Part III.D for a summary of the criticisms.
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In this section, we examine each major criticism of the ISA system in 
turn. The first question that we consider is whether the ISA system is biased 
in favor of investors and against states (Section A). That is related to 
another criticism—that decision-making in ISA is restricted to a closed 
circle of particular elites, mostly dominated by older, white males (Section 
B). The question also arises whether the traditional assumption that 
arbitration is fast, good, and cheap applies in practice as far as investor-state 
arbitration is concerned (Section C). Finally, we evaluate the extent to 
which ISA sufficiently incorporates the public interest (D).
A.  Bias Against States?
As mentioned, some developing countries feel that they are the 
“victims” of the ISA system and that decisions are systematically made 
against them.252 This sentiment may be supported by the fact that most ISA 
cases have historically been (perhaps not surprisingly) filed by investors 
from the North against states in the South.253 But as previously indicated, the 
mere fact that in many cases states from the South are defendants does not 
necessarily provide any evidence of a bias against the states as far as the 
contents of the award are concerned..
The issue of whether there is such a bias has been analyzed in detail in a 
variety of studies.254 Franck examined whether the results of investor-state 
arbitrations taking place within ICSID are substantially different from the 
outcomes in non-ICSID arbitration cases.255 Her study was done in response 
to the claim that the ICSID system is biased.256 Franck summarizes the 
criticisms on ICSID, including not only the lack of both transparency in 
decision-making and the possibility of appeal,257 but also an inconsistency of 
outcomes.258 Governments of some developing states argue that ICSID 
arbitration has a strong pro-investor bias, leading some states to withdraw 
from ICSID arbitration.259 Based on a detailed empirical study, however, 
Franck concludes that there is no difference in outcomes between ICSID 
252. Franck, supra note 6, at 436–37.
253. See supra Part IV.B. It is not surprising in the sense that much foreign direct 
investment also goes in that direction (from the North to the South) and that investors from 
the North may indeed see ISA as an alternative for the court system in host countries that they 
may not always trust.
254. See, e.g., Julian Donaubauer, Eric Neumayer & Peter Nunnenkamp, Winning or 
Losing in Investor-To-State Dispute Resolution: The Role of Arbitrator Bias and Experience,
26 REV. INT’L ECON. 892 (2018).
255. See Franck, supra note 145.
256. Id. at 829.
257. Id. at 841.
258. Id. at 843.
259. Id. at 844, 846–47. 
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and non-ICSID arbitrations.260 She holds that the idea of biased decision-
making by ICSID arbitration is largely based on misperceptions.261
In contrast, the findings of a recent empirical study by Behn, Tarald 
Berge (a scholar with research interest in international investment law), and 
Malcolm Langford (a professor of law with expertise in international 
investment law) lend more ammunition to the proposition that the ISA 
system is biased against developing states.262 Using a different methodology 
than Franck, these three scholars find that controlling for broad measures of 
good governance does not seem to temper the correlation between economic 
level and arbitration outcome.263 According to these scholars, Franck’s 
conflation theory (that arbitration outcomes reflect differences in 
governance) is not plausible unless it accounts for economic development 
and certain aspects of governance like the presence of impartial 
bureaucracies and property right protection.264 However, the research by the 
three scholars maintains that a higher level of economic development on the 
respondent side is associated with a lower success rate on the claimant side, 
lending some credibility to the hypothesis that the outcome for respondent 
states is largely contingent on their economic power, not their governance 
level.265
There are, furthermore, other studies that warrant introduction in order 
to provide a more balanced picture about the claimed bias against states. 
Schultz and Dupont examine the extent to which the dispute settlement 
regime contributes to the international rule of law.266 The researchers 
conclude that investment arbitration does not contribute as much to the 
international rule of law as its supporters might hope.267 Their data shows 
that “the haves (the host states with a higher development status) stand a 
higher chance of successfully defending off claims than the have-nots (the 
weaker parties with a lower development status).”268 More precisely, 
outcome data from 1972–2010 show that low income countries won 50% of 
260. Id. at 897–98.
261. Id. at 909. The studies by Franck and her colleagues are said to put forward an 
interesting theoretical argument that the impression of the relationship between arbitration 
outcomes and respondent states’ economic development may have conflated the concerns of 
economic development and the concerns of respondent states’ level of good governance. 
Daniel Behn et al., Poor States or Poor Governance? Explaining Outcomes in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 38 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 333, 336–337 (2018).
262. Behn et al., supra note 261, at 381 (2018).
263. Id. at 337–38.
264. Id. at 380.
265. Id. at 380–81.
266. The meaning of rule of law employed in that research is “formal legality.” “Formal 
legality requires, for instance, that the rules be formulated in general terms, that they be 
accessible and understandable by their addressees, and that they be applied coherently, 
consistently, competently, and impartially.” Schultz & Dupont, supra note 12, at 1163–64.
267. Id. at 1167.
268. Id. at 1166.
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cases against investors while high income countries had a higher win rate of 
69%.269 This difference in success rate grew in the 1998–2010 boom in 
investment arbitration; developed countries won 46% of cases during that 
time, and developing countries won just 27%.270 It is the researchers’ 
opinion that “[w]hen a dispute settlement system favors the stronger parties 
to such an extent, the international rule of law is pursued less than fully.”271
The empirical study by Wellhausen mentioned above also contributes to 
our knowledge of the outcomes out of ISA cases from 1990 to 2014. She 
found that across her dataset, respondent states won 38% of the time and 
settled 33% of the time.272 When it comes to cases where U.S. investors 
were the claimants, respondent states won 36% of the time and settled 36% 
of the time.273 These results seem to be almost the same for ISA cases 
involving British investors (34% and 34%, respectively). Thus, one can 
safely argue that prominent ISA participants, such as U.S. and British 
investors, are not systematically prevailing over respondent states.274 Her 
research also points out that states in the Middle East, North Africa, and 
Europe (including the former Soviet Union) have a higher rate of success in 
investment arbitration than the aggregate state win rate of 38%.275 While the 
average success rate for Asian countries is around the mean, American 
countries and Sub-Saharan African countries tend to suffer from a lower 
probability of winning a case.276 Of the thirty-one ISA cases against OECD 
states that concluded by the end of 2014, respondent OECD states won 55% 
of the time.277 Thus, Wellhausen’s study also provides support for the claim 
that developed countries seem to have fared better than their developing 
counterparts in ISA.
Additionally, through statistical analysis of the outcomes of ISA cases 
between September 2011 and September 2014, Behn found  that the data 
does not seem to show a pro-investor bias among tribunals because less than 
half of investors’ claims were successful.278 In fact, measured against the 
ICSID caseload, the data show an increase in cases where tribunals denied 
jurisdiction,279 in contrast to the expectations of the theoretical literature. 
Behn puts forward two possible explanations for this phenomenon. One is 
that the tribunals are increasing their scrutiny over the threshold issues that 
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1165–1167.
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allow for jurisdiction over a claim; the other is that more unfounded claims 
are being screened out at the preliminary stage by investment tribunals.280
Another example of interesting empirical research was conducted by 
Van Harten, who validated the hypothesis that systemic bias exists in the 
resolution of contested jurisdictional issues in investment treaty law by 
reviewing a database of 115 ISA cases.281 This research is unique because it 
does not track the resolution of all issues that distribute interests between 
the disputing parties, but rather focuses on specific issues related to the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals, such as whether investors are “corporate 
persons” or “natural persons” and the scope of covered “investments.”282
Thus, unlike Behn’s research, which focuses on the outcomes of ISA cases, 
Van Harten’s research covers the content analysis of jurisdictional rulings. 
Different benchmarks for evaluation are very likely to lead to different 
conclusions even if the dataset is identical, and it usually is not. Van Harten 
concludes that, in the context of these jurisdictional issues, arbitrators seem 
to favor the stance of investors over that of sovereign states, i.e., they favor 
those stances that enable them to arbitrate.283 In other words, this research 
provides “tentative support for expectations of systemic bias arising from 
the interests of arbitrators in light of the system’s asymmetrical claims 
structure and the absence of conventional markers of judicial 
independence.”284
B.  Elites?
Arbitration practitioners, including arbitrators, legal counsel, experts, 
and tribunal secretaries, are of crucial importance for the legitimacy of the 
investor-state arbitration regime. Considering the fact that the perceived bias 
within national courts is one of the factors that prompted the establishment 
of this regime,285 one can well understand why any irregularity would raise 
grave concerns for the disputing parties. The impartiality and independence 
of ISA arbitrators, as the adjudicators in this asymmetrical decision-making 
system, have faced doubt for a long time.
Eberhardt and Olivet believe that investment arbitrators form a small 
and cohesive community. As such, they “have a tight grip on the investment 
arbitration system and can exert immense influence over it.”286 Their 
research finds that arbitrators from Western Europe and North America take 
280. Id.
281. See Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An 
Empirical Study of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 252 (2012).
282. See Id. at 211, 233–34.
283. Id. at 252.
284. Id.
285. See, e.g., Alexandre Gauthier, supra note 84, at 1–2.
286. Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 134, at 36.
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charge of 69% of cases handled at the ICSID.287 Among arbitrators who 
have adjudicated more than ten cases, the proportion of arbitrators from the 
two regions jumps to 83%.288 Of the arbitrators considered in their research, 
only 4% are women, with just two individuals accounting for three-quarters 
of cases with female arbitrators.289 This data points to an apparent lack of 
diversity among arbitrators in terms of nationality and gender.
The freshly published World Investment Report 2018 also expresses 
concern of the same kind.290 Out of the thirteen arbitrators appointed in more 
than thirty cases considered by the report, all of them but one is a citizen of 
a European or North American country, and eleven of them are men.291
Notably, the only two female arbitrators on the list are among the three 
most-appointed arbitrators globally.292
Eberhardt and Olivet, meanwhile, assert that arbitrators have close links 
with the corporate world and share the view of businesses that protecting 
private interests is of extraordinary importance.293 Contrary to Jan 
Paulsson’s dismissal of the existence of an “elite” group of arbitrators,294
Eberhardt and Olivet confirm that there is a group of fifteen elite arbitrators, 
of which Paulsson is a high-ranking member.295 This group of elites has 
considerable overlap with the World Investment Report’s 2018 list of 
thirteen arbitrators most frequently appointed to investment tribunals.296
Eberhardt and Olivet’s statistical work finds that together the fifteen have 
decided 55% of the 450 investment-treaty disputes they examined, 64% of 
123 treaty disputes of at least $100 million USD (value of investor claims), 
and 75% of sixteen treaty disputes of at least $4 billion USD.297 They claim 
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more than twice, with another elite arbitrator on the same panel.298 In their 
opinion, these data demonstrate the influence of non-legal factors on the 
outcomes of investment arbitration, such as arbitrators’ policy preferences, 
and their social and personal backgrounds.299
The frequency with which elite arbitrators regularly serve on the same 
tribunals makes the criticism of “revolving doors” in the ISA community 
more worrisome. The “revolving door” concept (also known as “double-
hatting”) refers to the practice of arbitration practitioners simultaneously 
holding a variety of roles in investment arbitration practice, including 
arbitrator, legal counsel, expert witness, and tribunal secretary. This practice 
is deemed as an encroachment on the impartiality and independence of 
arbitrators and even a fundamental challenge to the whole regime of 
investment arbitration more broadly.300 Eberhardt and Olivet found that 
there are a significant number of cases in which one of the elite fifteen sits 
on an arbitral panel, while another member of that group serves as legal 
counsel for either the investor or the state.301 Some cases have even seen the 
concurrent appearance of up to four members of the elite fifteen.302
An ambitious research paper by Langford, Behn, and Lie (a scholar 
with research interest in ISA) purports to have conducted the first-ever 
comprehensive empirical analysis of the individuals making up the entire 
investment arbitration community, with a dataset covering 1,039 investment 
arbitration cases (including ICSID annulment proceedings) and 3,910 
arbitration practitioners.303 The empirical study reveals that the revolving 
door continues to exist in investment arbitration and that the double-hatting 
accusation can be partly substantiated.304 This is because the double-hatting 
is not a widespread or rampant practice in investment arbitration, but it is 
common among a core group of influential ISA practitioners.305 Despite the 
small scale of the revolving door phenomenon, the researchers argue that it 
raises alarming concerns about bias, impartiality, independence, and 
legitimacy in the ISA regime.306 The mere existence of this phenomenon 
calls for reforms that address these concerns.307
These narratives confirm the impression that the ISA community is 
characterized by a severe lack of diversity. On the other hand, Kovacs and 
Fawke examined seven parameters for diversity among arbitrators and 
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found a more mixed picture.308 While ISA may not be diverse in terms of 
gender and nationality, ISA displays impressive diversity in such areas as 
professional experience, legal tradition, language, and public international 
law expertise.309 Yet the field’s underrepresentation in some forms of 
diversity—like the involvement of arbitrators from low-income countries—
precisely explains continuing suspicions against ISA.
C.  Fast, Good, Cheap?
One of the purported advantages of arbitration is that arbitration is 
faster, better, and cheaper than adjudication in national courts.310 The 
question arises whether the ISA system meets those goals in practice and 
whether it is possible to meet all three goals at the same time.
Kirby compares the objectives of international arbitration to a sign at a 
U.S. drycleaner that says, “Fast. Good. Cheap. Pick two.”311 Parties seeking 
arbitration face the same dilemma: Ideally, parties want arbitration to be 
fast, good, and cheap, but it may be impossible to realize this “iron 
triangle.”312 In practice, there are tradeoffs between the speed of decision-
making, its quality, and the costs involved, and it may ultimately be 
impossible to reach those three objectives at the same time.
The empirical research seems to confirm these doubts. Beginning with 
the first purported advantage—speed—many argue that the increasing size 
and complexity of investor claims have driven an increase in the length of 
proceedings. Compared to the mean investment arbitration length of 3.7 
years recorded in Hodgson’s first study, his second study— with 
Campbell—found that the mean length of arbitral proceedings was 4.3 
years.313 However, on the basis of the median length of arbitral proceedings, 
the difference is negligible: from 3.6 years to 3.7 years.314 Taking all the 
308. The seven aspects involved in Kovacs and Fawke’s empirical study are “(i) gender, 
(ii) nationality, (iii) legal tradition . . . (iv) university, (v) professional experience, (vi) 
languages, and (vii) public international law expertise.” Robert Kovacs & Alex Fawke, An 
Empirical Analysis of Diversity in Investment Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,
12 TRANSNAT’L DISP. MGMT. 1, 3 (2015).
309. This empirical study did not include as many arbitrators in the field of investment 
arbitration as possible; instead, it was based on the assessment of the data with regard to the 
most appointed arbitrators, i.e., the fifty-two individuals who have been appointed to 
investment tribunals on ten or more occasions. Id. at 26.
310. See supra Part II.A.
311. Kirby, supra note 11, at 690.
312. Id.
313. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 229. This study covered arbitrations initiated 
between 2013 and 31 May 2017.
314. Id. The disparity between the mean and the median tribunal costs arguably results 
from the distorting effects of cases with dramatically large claims, as those cases would 
conceivably bear more technical complexities and consequentially require lengthier 
examination and deliberation.
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data in the two studies into consideration, the mean length of investment 
proceedings would be four years.315
Recall that from the Law and Economics studies presented earlier, 
arbitration should have the major advantage of speedier decision-making at 
lower costs, given the higher expertise of the arbiters involved.316 But the 
results of some empirical studies cast doubts on these starting points. 
Kovacs, for example, believes that “[i]nternational arbitration is becoming 
too slow, too formalized and too expensive,” in comparison to what it is 
supposed to be.317 Markert similarly complains that arbitration proceedings 
are a process that “has become too costly and inefficient.”318 He points to 
anecdotal evidence suggesting that arbitration proceedings have turned from 
a speedy and efficient process into a longer process more closely resembling 
complex U.S.-style litigation proceedings.319 Like Hodgson and Campbell, 
he found that arbitral proceedings under ICSID rules take longer than three 
years on average.320
The second purported advantage of arbitration, its quality,321 is 
obviously much more difficult to measure. However, the previous section 
indicated that there is at least some evidence that there may be a bias against 
states and toward investors, not only in the differences in the success rate of 
states with different developmental statuses, but also in the claimed 
systematic bias towards investors in jurisdictional decisions.322 Based on that 
evidence, most states in developing countries would therefore argue that the 
current ISA system is not “good.” It is unsurprising, then, that some states 
have withdrawn from the ICSID ISA system or threatened to do so.323
Most of the literature deals with the third advantage: Cost. Both the 
claimant and the respondent involved in an investment arbitration must be 
concerned with the costs incurred throughout the process.324 This is almost 
self-evident inasmuch costs spent on an arbitral proceeding have a direct 
and distinct impact on the financial profits of both investors and states.
315. Hodgson & Campbell, supra note 136.
316. See supra Part II.A.
317. Kovacs, supra note 28, at 155.
318. Markert, supra note 107, at 216.
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320. Id. at 217 (finding that ICSID proceedings take an average of 3.6 years).
321. We focus here on the expectation that arbitration will provide for a neutral and 
unbiased forum for dispute resolution as the crucial element of a “good” mechanism. 
322. See supra Part V.A.
323. Victorino J. Tejera, Unraveling ICSID’s Denunciation: Understanding the 
Interaction Between Articles 71 and 72 of the ICSID Convention, 20 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 423, 424 (2014).
324. Albert Jan van den Berg, Note, Time and Costs: Issues and Initiatives from an 
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Some costs of arbitration include fees for arbitrators, administration, 
legal representation, witnesses, and experts.325 In addition to these external 
costs paid to third parties, the parties themselves obviously also have 
internal costs, for instance, the costs needed to collect and preserve 
evidence. The latter are, however, often much more difficult to calculate. 
Susan Franck’s detailed study found that the costs of investment treaty 
arbitration have become substantial and that an assignment of even partial 
costs to one party could represent more than 10% of an average award.326
She also found that there is large uncertainty with respect to those costs.327
The OECD suggests, after conducting a survey on publicly available 
information about ISA costs (external costs), that the mean cost of recent 
ISA cases has totaled over $8 million USD, exceeding $30 million USD in 
some cases.328 Hodgson and Campbell reach a similar conclusion, though 
the specific data samples addressed by the scholars have an impact on their 
research outcomes. Their empirical study shows that, in their dataset of 177 
cases, the mean party cost is $7.4 million USD for claimants and $5.2 
million USD for respondent states.329 Generally, the larger the claim filed by 
an investor, the higher the cost of the case, but there are outliers as well.330
The high cost incurred by arbitral proceedings has been identified as 
one of the two gravest concerns about international arbitration among in-
house counsel, the other being the excessive duration of proceedings.331
Eberhardt and Olivet point to the experience of the Philippines to 
demonstrate the overwhelming costs of ISA. The developing state spent $58 
million USD defending two cases against German airport operator 
Fraport.332 In the Philippines, this same amount is equivalent to the annual 
salaries of 12,500 teachers, the cost of vaccinating 3.8 million children, or 
building two new airports.333
These expenditures do not necessarily go to arbitrators.334 The lion’s 
share ends up in the pockets of the legal counsel that the parties appoint to 
325. Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 134, at 15; Diana Rosert, The Stakes Are High: A 
Review of the Financial Costs of Investment Treaty Arbitration, INT’L INST. FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEV. 1, 8 (July 2014), http://www.iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/
stakes-are-high-review-financial-costs-investment-treaty-arbitration.pdf.
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327. Franck suggests that the determination of cost-related issues is largely 
unpredictable due to uncertainty with regard to how and on what basis tribunals will decide 
costs. Id. at 838–839.
328. OECD, Investor-State Dispute Settlement, at 18 (2012) [hereinafter OECD, ISDS], 
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represent them throughout the proceeding; the costs of representation are 
estimated to average more than 80% of the cost of a single ISA case.335
Arbitration lawyers charge several hundred dollars per hour per person, with 
prices reaching over $1,000 per hour per person at elite law firms.336
In contrast, the fees paid to arbitrators average about 16% of the whole 
sum of the costs of an individual case.337 Hodgson and Campbell found that 
the mean tribunal cost at the end of 2012 was $746,000 USD, with a median 
cost of $590,000 USD. 338 Nevertheless, the cost of arbitrators’ fees is 
steadily increasing, just like other arbitration costs: The mean tribunal cost 
from 2013 onwards increased to $1,118,000 USD, with a median amount of 
$905,000 USD, an increase of around 50%.339
Noticeably, relevant arbitration rules have set out different methods for 
the determination of the tribunal costs.340 For instance, within the framework 
of ICSID, the rules and regulations indicate that each arbitrator in the 
tribunal is entitled to earn $3,000 USD per day for meetings or other work 
in connection with the proceeding.341 In contrast, the UNCITRAL 
Arbitration Rules allow tribunals to determine their own fees in accordance 
with some flexible conditions, such as that the amount should be 
“reasonable,” “taking into account the amount in dispute, the complexity of 
the subject matter, the time spent by the arbitrators and any other relevant 
circumstances of the case.”342 As of the end of 2012, UNCITRAL tribunals 
were 10% more costly than ICSID tribunals, although that gap seems to be 
shrinking.343
Administration and registration fees payable to arbitral institutions, 
instead of to investment tribunals, only account for a minor part of 
arbitration’s overall cost, at about 2%.344 Similarly, the relevant arbitral 
institutions also apply different rates for the services that they provide for 
disputing parties.345 For instance, the SCC and ICC provide for an exact 
amount of administrative fees that must be paid by parties based on the 
amount in dispute, which means that the amount does not vary with the 
335. OECD, ISDS, supra note 328, at 18; Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 134, at 15.
336. A survey conducted by Global Arbitration Review in 2014 shows that the three law 
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duration of the arbitral proceeding.346 ICSID, on the other hand, charges 
$32,000 USD in administrative fees annually, so longer disputes are more 
expensive.347
One proposed reform of the ISA system in this regard is the creation of 
a more aggressive cost allocation system, which could force losing parties to 
pay a large share of the costs of their adversaries. Such a mechanism could 
provide parties with substantial incentives to limit or reduce unreasonable 
costs and to instead pursue efficient party behavior.348
Currently, applicable procedural rules and investment treaty provisions 
usually leave arbitrators some discretion to allocate the costs and fees 
between the disputing parties as they deem reasonable.349 Both the ICSID 
and UNCITRAL rules for the apportionment of costs and fees “leaves 
significant room for argumentation and arbitral discretion,”350 contributing 
to the uncertainty in disputing parties’ expectations of the costs and fees 
incurred by ISA proceedings. The most prevalent method applied by arbitral 
tribunals is “pay your own way,” requiring each side to cover their own 
counsel and expert fees and to share the tribunal costs.351 This means that 
whatever the outcome of an arbitration is, respondents, and therefore 
taxpayers, have to pay millions in legal fees.352
By using an empirical study to analyze the efficiency of cost-allocations 
in investment arbitration,353 Webster concluded that it is doubtful whether 
the current rules on cost-allocation within ICSID, which do not require cost-
shifting, sufficiently deter unmeritorious claims.354 More recent ISA cases 
have seen arbitrators switch methods, shifting at least some of the costs to 
the losing party.355
A cost-shifting approach, however, could be regarded as a double-
edged sword for sovereign states.356 Though governments would incur less 
of the costs for legal counsel and expert advice when they secure victory, 
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350. David Smith, Note, Shifting Sands: Cost-and-Fee Allocation in International 
Investment Arbitration, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 749, 750 (2011).
351. Rosert, supra note 325, at 13.
352. Eberhardt and Olivet quoted the case Plama Consortium v Bulgaria, in which the 
arbitral tribunal found that the claims filed by the investor were fraudulent. However, in the 
award, Bulgaria only obtained $7 million USD as compensation for legal fees incurred, 
accounting for shortly more than the half of the sum. OECD, ISDS, supra note 328, at 21; 
Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 134, at 15.
353. Webster, supra note 158, at 470–71.
354. Id. at 502, 505–506.
355. OECD, ISDS, supra note 328, at 21.
356. Smith, supra note 350, at 750.
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their liability for legal and expert costs would grow when their states lose.357
While there is mixed evidence on whether investors are favored in terms of 
cost allocation,358 a study by Rosert finds some indications that “states are 
slightly more likely to be ordered to pay a share of the investors’ costs when 
the investor wins than [when] the inverse is the case.”359
D.  Public Interest?
There are three other critical issues mentioned in the empirical literature 
with respect to investor-state arbitration. The first relates to its lack of 
transparency, the second relates to its lack of attention to environmental 
issues, and the third concerns whether there might be means to achieve the 
desirable depoliticization of investor-state disputes.
The issue of transparency is a major part of ISA’s legitimacy crisis.360
As international rules and norms are starting to gain the momentum to shape 
areas of domestic policy long regarded as exclusive to nation states,361
domestic stakeholders have been embracing the cause of transparency 
throughout ISA.362 Against this backdrop, Emilie Hafner-Burton (a 
Professor of International Justice and Human Rights) and David Victor (a 
Professor with expertise in international law and regulation) examined 
secrecy in international investment arbitration by conducting an empirical 
study covering the 246 ICSID investment arbitration cases that were 
concluded between 1972, when the first case was registered before ICSID 
and the beginning of 2012.363 The statistics they reviewed show that about 
40% of cases were kept secret.364 The authors suggest that secrecy in 
investment arbitration serves as a flexibility-enhancing device precisely 
when enormous publicity would go against the interests of the disputing 
parties.365 Despite the great efforts made by the arbitral scene to boost 
transparency in investment arbitration, Hafner-Burton and Victor hold the 
opinion that those reforms are, in part, failing because the disputing parties 
357. Joachim Pohl, Societal Benefits and Costs of International Investment Agreements: 
A Critical Review of Aspects and Available Empirical Evidence 48 (OECD Working Papers 
on Int’l Inv., No. 01, 2018), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/e5f85c3d-en.pdf.
358. OECD, ISDS, supra note 328, at 22.
359. Rosert, supra note 325, at 14.
360. See, e.g., James D. Fry & Odysseas G. Repousis, Towards a New World for 
Investor-State Arbitration Through Transparency, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795, 806–07
(2016). 
361. William Burke-White & Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Future of International Law Is 
Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 327, 327 (2006).
362. See Stephan W. Schill, Editorial, Five Times Transparency in International 
Investment Law, 15 J. OF WORLD INV. & TRADE 363 (2014).
363. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & David G. Victor, Secrecy in International Investment 
Arbitration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. OF INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 161, 164 (2016).
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prefer “to use pre-judgment settlement to hide procedural and substantive 
outcomes.”366
In that context, they put forward three proposals to promote 
transparency in ISA.367 They suggest that sovereign countries could 
incorporate clauses “demanding the mandatory disclosure of all awards (as 
in the UNCITRAL reforms) and settlements” or even require parties to 
“request the tribunal to embody the settlement in an arbitral award” in their 
future investment treaty practice.368 In addition, they propose that changes 
can be made to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, instead of the ICSID 
Convention (whose change would require the consensus of all of the 
Convention’s Contracting States), to require the Secretariat to publish the 
basic terms of a settlement upon the consent of the disputing parties.369 Last, 
in their opinion, other informal improvements may also contribute to a 
higher level of transparency in ISA, such as the establishment of best 
practices for disclosure and arbitrators’ proactive encouragement of the 
parties to disclose settlement information.370
Another point of controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the ISA 
regime is the tension between environmental protection and the protection 
of investor rights. Some of the critics of ISA raise the concern that the 
regulatory power of sovereign states to enact laws and regulations to protect 
the environment for the general good of the public is severely circumscribed 
by the international investment regime, either because states fear being sued 
in international tribunals or because they fear having to pay compensation to 
investors.371 In a bid to test the hypothesized negative impact of ISA on 
environmental protection, Behn and Langford compiled a database of more 
than 800 registered cases and looked into the environmental cases 
specifically.372
Their empirical study obtained some surprising and interesting results: 
First, the win-loss ratio for claimants in environmental cases showed no 
significant divergence from that of all ISA cases.373 On the one hand, in 
those cases in which the claimant failed, the arbitral tribunals recognized the 
protection of the environment as a part of the legitimate defense presented 
by the respondent states. On the other hand, in cases where the claimants 
prevailed, the tribunals seemed to view the legitimacy of environmental 
366. Id. at 161.
367. Id. at 181–82.
368. Id. at 181.
369. Id. at 181–82.
370. Id. at 182.
371. Daniel Behn & Malcolm Langford, Trumping the Environment? An Empirical 
Perspective on the Legitimacy of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 18 J. OF WORLD INV. &
TRADE 14, 15 (2017).
372. Id. at 16.
373. Id. at 47.
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protection measures with suspicion.374 Behn and Langford argue that the 
languages of some of these findings in favor of investors may indicate that 
investment tribunals have not yet fully embraced “the importance of 
environmental arguments and their values [in] the adjudication of these 
kinds of disputes.”375
The researchers found that of the forty-seven environmental cases they 
studied, there were only four cases in which investors challenged domestic 
legislation, and all four cases culminated in the failure of the investors.376
This indicates that the erosion of sovereign states’ regulatory autonomy by
ISA might not be so grave as envisaged.377 The researchers also found that 
challenges put forward by claimants against specific non-legislative 
measures (e.g., the cancellation of concessions or contracts) in the extractive 
industries and the water and waste sector are likely to be favored by arbitral 
tribunals, but claimants fared quite poorly when they targeted generally 
applicable measures, particularly those banning the import or sale of 
products for the sake of environmental protection.378 Another striking 
finding is that in environmental cases developing states seem to fare better 
than developed states.379
The depoliticization of investor-state disputes—transferring the disputes 
“from the political arena of diplomatic protection to a judicial forum with 
objective, previously agreed standards and a pre-formulated dispute 
settlement process”380 —is another issue of public interest. In an OECD 
Working Paper, Pohl was unable to discern a unified concept or scope of 
“depoliticization,” but indicated that it is usually understood to serve three 
ends: the enhancement of (1) intergovernmental relationships; (2) 
relationships between companies and their home governments; and (3) 
competition among firms.381
The depoliticization of investment disputes was not only a major
objective during the preparatory stage of the ICSID Convention, but it is 
still recognized by the present literature as an important policy goal of the 
ISA system.382 However, it is unclear whether the depoliticization effect 
emanated from ISA, or the scope of this effect.383 Owing to the very limited 
empirical evidence available, Pohl was unable to draw a conclusion on the 
extent to which IIAs, through ISA mechanisms, depoliticize investor-state 
374. Id. at 47–48.
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disputes.384 There is limited anecdotal evidence, however, suggesting that 
notwithstanding the existence of ISDS, IIAs lead to more, rather than less, 
diplomatic interaction between states concerned in dispute resolution.385 In 
addition, Pohl showcases sources indicating that the depoliticization effect 
of ISDS is at least open to doubts, as recent cases have witnessed 
simultaneous political activities by investors’ home states to protect their 
nationals, for example via diplomatic protection, in parallel to the ongoing 
investor-state arbitration.386
E.  Summary
The empirical evidence that we reviewed in this section provides some 
support for the complaints from developing countries about an alleged bias 
in investor-state arbitration, even though the studies are not one-
dimensional.387  A first, often-quoted study by Franck found that there is no 
empirical support for a bias toward investors in the ICSID system.388
However, later studies seem to indicate that investors who are largely from 
the North do have a higher probability of success in investor-state 
arbitration compared to developing states.389
Of course, one should also be careful in interpreting the empirical 
finding that investors from the North have a higher probability of success in 
ISA than defendant states from the South as clear evidence of bias.390 After 
all, the default expectation should not necessarily be that investors and 
states should have equal rates of success in ISA. There may also be 
substantive reasons to assume that one party (the investor) might do better 
in ISA than the other (the state). That could be the case because ISA is 
investor-initiated, or it could be because of the nature of ISA disputes: They 
are brought by investors when a state has allegedly violated its obligations 
under a bilateral investment treaty. Assuming investors are utility 
maximizers, they are not likely to resort to ISA without any factual or legal 
bases.
In any case, there is clear evidence that investor-state arbitration is 
dominated by a small, insular elite of arbitration practitioners with strong 
384. Id. at 50–55. Still, Pohl seems to have limited confidence in the depoliticization 
effect of ISDS, saying “[b]ased on available empirical evidence, IIAs thus do not appear to 
mechanically depoliticise disputes, but they may provide greater comfort for governments to 
refrain, at their discretion, from intervening or limiting their intervention.” But he also admits 
that “[w]hether or not IIAs make a positive contribution to any of the ultimate goals of 
depoliticization in practice, however, remains uncertain in the absence of sufficient empirical 
evidence.” Id. at 54.
385. Id.
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387. See supra Part V.A.
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389. Daniel Behn et al., supra note 186, at 369–70.
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contacts in the corporate world.391 These elite arbitrators overwhelmingly 
come from the North, thus substantiating the feelings of discomfort from the 
South.392 It is, at first blush, not theoretically clear why old, white males 
from the North would be overrepresented in ISA. The cause could either be 
supply-driven (implying that it is primarily those types of people presenting 
themselves as arbitrators), demand-driven (meaning that parties primarily 
call on those types of people to serve as their arbitrators), or potentially a 
combination of both. Even though it is difficult to find a precise cause for 
the overrepresentation of particular groups, the important point is that it 
does give support to the suspicions of Southern states against the ISA 
system.
Finally, the assumption that arbitration is cheap and speedy seems to be 
contradicted by the practice of investor-state arbitration.393 The evidence 
shows that ISA’s procedures are both extremely costly (with some 
scholarship indicating particularly high costs for developing countries, 
compared to their limited public budgets) and very lengthy.394 Although it is 
difficult to compare the length and costs of ISA proceedings to the average 
court procedure around the world, the fact that some states (notably 
developing states) stepping away from the ISA system shows that these 
countries feel more comfortable with their judiciaries handling investor-
state disputes. In sum, the empirical evidence reviewed seems to 
substantiate the calls for reform of the system.
VI.  Analysis
Given the empirical studies we have reviewed in the past two sections, 
it will come as no surprise that there are calls to reform the system.395
Indeed, the empirical evidence substantiates these calls.396 Though both the 
empirical studies and the Law and Economics literature could furnish 
inspiration for the reform of ISA, the Law and Economics literature on 
arbitration generally does not account for the practice of ISA. The empirical 
studies reviewed in this paper not only bring some of the concerns about the 
legitimacy of ISA into focus, but also stimulate maneuvers to shed the 
burdens that are haunting the ISA regime.
391. Eberhardt & Olivet, supra note 134, at 36.
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A.  The Law and Economics Literature and ISA Reform
Law and Economics scholars emphasize that arbitrators, as opposed to 
judges in domestic courts, are likely to specialize in a particular type of 
dispute.397 This is at least as true in investment arbitration as in commercial 
arbitration. The resolution of international investment disputes via 
arbitration in most cases involves the application and interpretation of 
protective provisions enshrined by IIAs, thus raising a demand for 
arbitrators to have relatively specialized knowledge and experience in the 
field of public international law.398 In fact, the community of investment 
arbitrators is much smaller than that of commercial arbitrators, because 
many commercial arbitrators do not feel comfortable dealing with investor-
state disputes or simply are not chosen by disputing parties for that 
purpose.399 Although there has not been a systematic investigation into the 
background of all the arbitrators involved in ISA, many of the most 
prominent figures in this community have rich knowledge of and experience 
in public international law.400
Under Law and Economics theories of arbitration, this specialization of 
investment arbitrators should not only lure foreign investors away from 
litigation in national courts, but also contribute to lowering costs for 
disputing parties and improving the efficiency of dispute resolution.401 It 
follows that any attempt to reform ISA should not overlook the value of 
adjudicators specialized in public international law, as this specialization 
arguably leads to better decisions and lower costs for disputants. For this 
reason, Colin Brown (Deputy Head of Unit, Legal Aspects of Trade Policy 
and Dispute Settlement, Directorate General for Trade, European 
Commission), suggests that a multilateral investment dispute resolution 
mechanism should carefully consider the qualifications of adjudicators.402
Other advantages of arbitration over litigation seem to have less 
application in the ISA context. For example, investment arbitration does not 
seem to be less adversarial than litigation; foreign investors almost always 
397. Rubino-Sammartano, supra note 14, at 168.
398. Böckstiegel, supra note 115, at 582.
399. Id.
400. To give an example, background research on the fifteen elite arbitrators identified 
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international tribunals seem to echo those of the International Court of Justice. Colin M. 
Brown, A Multilateral Mechanism for the Settlement of Investment Disputes. Some 
Preliminary Sketches, 32 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN INV. L.J. 673, 682 (2017) (“The Court shall 
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file claims directly against host states at the international level.403 That 
sovereign states have to bear the liability as a result of ISA, even if it was a 
state’s political sub-division that breached that state’s treaty obligations 
toward foreign investors under IIAs, could even exacerbate the antagonism 
between the disputing parties.404
Turning to the oft-claimed advantage that disputing parties are able to 
maintain the privacy of their dispute resolution at their discretion, 
confidentiality does not seem to be appreciated as much in the ISA context 
as in the commercial arbitration context. Critics have long condemned the 
lack of transparency at all stages of investment arbitral proceedings.405 In 
recent years, though, ISA has witnessed increased transparency, exemplified 
by the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State 
Arbitration (2014)406 and the United Nations Convention on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration.407 These efforts certainly contain 
loopholes, however, and challenges for boosting transparency in ISA still 
remain.408
In addition, with regard to the freedom to choose applicable law, 
businesspeople are unlikely to have that much discretion to avoid the 
application of state-made law in ISA because, as Professor Christoph 
Schreuer (a respected authority in international investment law) points out,
403. Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work: An Evaluation 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 77 (2005).
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INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. (July 12, 2011), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2011/07/12/
federalism-and-international-investment-disputes. 
405. INT’L BAR ASS’N., Consistency, Efficiency, and Transparency in Investment Treaty 
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“[s]ome questions that are relevant to a tribunal’s jurisdiction are governed 
by domestic law.”409
There are also some situations in which the Law and Economics 
literature suggests that commercial arbitration might be flawed, and those 
flaws are also present in ISA. For example, the Law and Economics 
literature comparing the incentives of judges to those of arbitrators suggests 
that party-appointed arbitrators may not really be the best choice for the 
resolution of investor-state disputes.410 Given the broad discretion that 
disputing parties usually have to choose adjudicators in arbitration,411 one 
might imagine that disputing parties would spare no effort to appoint an 
arbitrator who is more likely to side with them. According to celebrated 
arbitrators Jan Paulsson and Yves Derains, this affiliation effect—and its 
attendant moral hazard—does exist in commercial arbitration, as well as in 
ICSID arbitration.412
This innate deficiency of the party-appointed arbitrator system could 
drag any given investor-state dispute into a run-off between the arbitrators 
who were appointed by the investor party and the state party, respectively, 
and many frequent investment arbitrators are believed to be polarized (either 
biased towards investors or states).413 Although the presiding arbitrator 
could be expected to pour oil on troubled waters in such a situation, the 
party-appointment system casts doubt on the independence of investment 
tribunals and arbitrators.414 This is not to say that arbitrators in ISA are not 
figures of high moral character and good conscience, or that a presiding 
arbitrator could not act as a check on rest of the tribunal. However, the risks 
associated with the partisan arbitrator system could be averted by changing 
the method for the appointment of adjudicators.
One way to remove the nexus between disputing parties and 
adjudicators is through Brown’s sketch of the adjudicator-selection system. 
In that system, parties would rely on a multilateral investment court to select 
their adjudicators, and they would be stripped of the power to determine 
who would sit on a particular case.415
As discussed above, Law and Economics scholarship also suggests that 
arbitrators seeking to maximize their utility ought to pursue a constant flow 
of income. They are, therefore, subject to considerable market pressure as 
they issue awards.416 It follows then, that there is a lurking risk that 
409. Christoph Schreuer, Jurisdiction and Applicable Law in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, 1 MCGILL J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 4 (2014).
410. Van Aaken & Broude, supra note 19, at 15–16.
411. Benson, supra note 13, at 162.
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investment arbitrators may be prone to “split the difference” in the process 
of decision-making, with arbitrators tempted to put the satisfaction of the 
disputing parties before the facts and applicable laws in a particular case. 
Meanwhile, the affiliation effect in ISA is intensified further by the 
asymmetrical nature of investor-state disputes. As mentioned earlier, 
challenges to investment arbitrators are hard and often ineffective, 
particularly in the context of ICSID arbitration.417 Consequently, arbitrators 
are more willing to express either a consistent pro-investor or pro-state 
stance, marketing themselves to either foreign investors or sovereign states 
in order to increase their chances of appointment to investment tribunals,418
than they would be if the system had a more effective challenge procedure, 
which opposing parties could use to penalize arbitrator bias. Branson also 
points out the risk of “replacing judges, government ministers and 
professors . . . with lawyers who require arbitration fees for their 
livelihood,” and who therefore have additional moral hazard.419
The incentive for investment arbitrators to maximize their utility also 
raises suspicion about their decisions at the jurisdictional phase (not just in 
their rulings on the merits), since a negative jurisdictional ruling diminishes 
their profits from a particular case.420 This concern about the legitimacy of 
ISA appears difficult to address under the current operating mechanism 
because it is heavily reliant on the commercial arbitration model where 
arbitrators are remunerated by disputing parties.421 Again, Brown’s proposal 
of an investment court seems to effectively diminish, if not remove, this 
exact concern.422
He envisions a system of full-time adjudicators who would be 
remunerated regardless of the number of cases that they handle.423 Under 
these circumstances, adjudicators would be able to devote themselves to 
delivering high-quality decision-making in accordance with facts and 
applicable laws, rather than worrying about responses to their decisions that 
may threaten their income.424 On the other hand, it is worth repeating the 
caution from the Law and Economics literature that salaried judges may 
417. Giorgetti, supra note 159, at 475.
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have less incentive than arbitrators to deliver high-quality decisions.425 Thus, 
to ensure that the judges of a multilateral court are motivated to perform 
well, the designers of such a court should remember that judges derive 
utility from more than one source and use a mixture of reasonable 
arrangements to motivate their performance.426
The Law and Economics literature also warns of the social cost of 
arbitration. Recall that Landes and Posner preferred litigation to arbitration 
because of the positive externalities generated by litigation. This position 
provides tentative support for the proposal to replace the current arbitral 
system with a court for resolving investor-state disputes, as court litigation 
not only dispenses justice to disputing parties, but also produces public 
good. Society as a whole benefits when court litigation generates precedents 
and incentivizes adjudicators to provide detailed reasoning for their 
decisions.427
However, in the context of ISA as it is today, this logic may not stand 
so firmly. First, as discussed above, the arbitration community has already 
taken steps to increase transparency in ISA proceedings in recent years in 
recognition of the considerable public interests often involved in investor-
state disputes. Second, as mentioned in Part III, investment tribunals in 
practice tend to refer to previous investment awards to either reinforce their 
own arguments or contradict the opinions of prior tribunals.428 At the same 
time, investment awards have become more accessible to the public, 
generating positive externalities similar to court precedent by enlightening 
disputing parties and society in general. But it is equally true that the 
inconsistency of outcomes in ISA has made it difficult for investors and 
states to predict the outcomes of their actions if arbitration is pursued.429
Third, a closer examination of investment awards issued by various 
tribunals, which not infrequently consist of dozens of pages, would pose a 
425. POSNER, supra note 41, at 570.
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head-on challenge to the statement that arbitrators deliberately avoid the 
clarity of rules and norms by not writing down their opinions.430
The increased transparency in ISA proceedings as well as investment 
arbitrators’ willingness to write down their opinions show that there are 
particular features of ISA that do not specifically map onto the Law and 
Economics analysis of commercial arbitration. Still, some of the important 
points mentioned in the Law and Economics literature (that arbitration does 
not generate positive externalities in the same way as court decisions) 
remain relevant today and may provide arguments for a reform of ISA 
toward a multilateral investment court.
B.  Empirical Studies and ISA Reform
The empirical studies discussed in this article do not represent an 
exhaustive overview of all the empirics available in this domain. The
broader empirics themselves also do not deal with every criticism of ISA in 
the literature.431 For example, the inconsistency of arbitral decisions is cited 
as a major concern threatening the predictability and legitimacy of ISA.432
Yet there seems to be no systematic, empirical research efforts examining 
whether outcomes are indeed inconsistent.433
Empirical studies remain important in the debate concerning the reform 
of ISA, however. The empirical studies have shown a clear picture of 
changes in the pattern of arbitration filings.434 Whereas the traditional 
pattern of ISA pitted foreign investors from developed states against less 
developed states, more and more developed states are being brought to 
arbitration by foreign investors.435 Considering that the outward FDI flows 
from developing countries have become more significant in the past couple 
of decades,436 the pattern of filings in ISA is likely to shift further with more 
participation from developing country investors on the claimant side.437 This 
transition, if it happens, may provide evidence that ISA is not a political tool 
against less developed states and should not be demonized as such.
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In addition, empirical work has led to the concerning conclusion that 
developed countries have consistently higher success rates than less 
developed countries in the ISA proceedings initiated against them.438
Although there could be possibly dozens of reasons that account for this 
disparity, and the disparity itself is not adequate evidence that the ISA 
regime is severely biased against Southern countries, the perception of bias 
within ISA may gradually lead developing countries to lose confidence in 
this dispute resolution system. In light of the general disadvantages of the 
Southern countries in global politics and economics, it is important that any 
initiative aiming to reform the current system gives due attention the 
concerns of these countries.
A lack of diversity within the arbitration community is also a consistent 
source of worry.439 While the ISA arbitrator community is diverse in a few 
aspects, there is a severe lack of diversity in terms of gender and 
geographical representation.440 The dominance of ISA by elderly, white, 
male arbitrators not only aggravates the negative impression of the Southern 
countries concerning ISA but also threatens the (perceived) fairness of the 
system since “diverse decisionmakers are more likely to avoid cognitive 
biases and group-think in decision making.”441 The lack of involvement of 
arbitrators from the Southern countries could in part result from the fact that 
the legal services industries in those countries are in general less developed 
than those of Northern countries. This, in turn, can be traced to more 
fundamental issues, such as economic power, social systems, and legal 
traditions.442
However, a dearth of Southern arbitrators is not an excuse for not 
making changes to increase representation from Southern countries. The 
International Court of Justice and the World Trade Organization have 
already set good examples of inclusiveness.443 Furthermore, the few female 
arbitrators within the elite fifteen are recognized and commended by the 
arbitration industry and disputing parties at least as often as the male 
arbitrators are, further corroborating that the artificial barrier for female 
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arbitrators to enter into investment arbitration should be demolished.444
There is, however, the need to emphasize once again that diversity and 
inclusiveness is inherently valuable since it relates to the sociological and 
even normative legitimacy of an adjudicatory regime.445
Another conclusion that may be readily drawn from empirical studies is 
that the amount of compensation claimed by foreign investors and awarded 
by investment tribunals has skyrocketed, and it shows no signs of slowing 
down.446 Though this dramatic rise could be a natural outcome of the 
development of global FDI activities and thus does not necessarily pose any 
challenge to the ISA regime itself, the tremendous interests concerned 
require a reform of ISA to ensure fairness, integrity, and transparency. The
increase in compensation also stimulates us to consider whether it is still 
reasonable to let ad hoc tribunals deal with investor-state disputes that 
involve such enormous interests and complicated issues.
Despite the fact that the skyrocketing costs could be a consequence of 
increasingly complicated cases and the increased resources that countries 
pour into dispute resolution, increased costs constitute a threat to a 
sustainable development of the ISA regime.447 First of all, the higher costs 
involved in ISA make it difficult for less wealthy individuals and enterprises 
to gain access to international arbitration, making participation in ISA a 
privilege that serves the interests of an exclusive group of powerful 
individuals and companies.448 Second, increased costs impose an even 
heavier burden on the budgets of the Southern countries, which may 
ultimately nudge those countries to withdraw from ISA, shaking up the 
basis of the whole ISA regime.449
There are a variety of reform proposals on this front: The government 
of Thailand, for instance, suggested that, because governments lack an 
international body which specializes in independent and low-cost ISA 
advice for developing countries, they have to endure the steep price of legal 
services provided by international law firms.450 The academic community 
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supports this call for the establishment of a legal assistance center to 
alleviate the strain on developing countries’ budgets.451
Rosert also suggests other measures to bring the costs involved in ISA 
down.452 First, there is still room for arbitration procedures to be streamlined 
so that both arbitration costs and legal fees can be reduced.453 For instance, it 
was suggested that there could be “mandatory direction or encouragement 
of parties to arbitrate disputes via a sole arbitrator rather than a panel of 
three arbitrators in smaller value or less complex disputes.”454 Second, 
sovereign states and the broader international community should endeavor 
to build up their capacity to defend claims by foreign investors on their own, 
tempering their reliance on pricey international law firms.455 Third, more 
efforts to discourage frivolous and inflated claims could also help to reduce 
the adverse influence of high costs, including more frequent use of cost-
shifting policies.456
VII.  Concluding Remarks
In this article we attempt, for the first time, to integrate the Law and 
Economics literature concerning arbitration with empirical evidence 
concerning how ISA functions in practice. There is a striking difference 
between the theoretical assumptions and reality. The traditional Law and 
Economics literature assumes that arbitration is speedy and inexpensive.457
But it is not clear to what extent those assumptions are really met in ISA. 
There are increasing complaints about relatively high costs and lengthy 
procedures that almost rival those of the American judiciary.458 In that 
respect, it is not surprising that scholars, parties, and practitioners are calling 
for reform, since some of the traditional benefits of arbitration do not 
always seem to hold.
Another assumption in the Law and Economics literature is that 
arbitration generates exchangeable decisions. Ashenfelter’s model assumed 
that arbitrators tend toward “the middle of the road” awards, since extreme 
positions do not lead to new appointments.459 Outliers were not expected. 
However, in the practice of ISA, there are complaints that many frequent 
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investment arbitrators tend to be biased in favor of either the investor side or 
the state side.460
Interestingly, the Law and Economics literature is generally critical of 
arbitration; despite its ability to provide private benefits to parties (at least 
the assumed benefits of lower cost, better information, and speedy decision-
making), scholars are concerned about its social costs.461 According to this
thinking, the public good of adjudication is lost as a result of the secrecy in 
arbitration. Precisely for that reason, one can understand the calls for 
transparency, especially in investor-state arbitration. Indeed, an empirical 
study introduced above found that 40% of the cases covered were kept 
secret, indicating that lack of transparency is an unsettled problem in the 
ISA system.462 Given the public interest involved (going beyond the mere 
interest of the private parties in the dispute), transparency in ISA has the 
advantage of creating positive externalities. The recent trend in the ISA 
practice, with the publication of the UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in 
Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration and the United Nations Convention 
on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, shows the signs 
that transparency is improving. For the same reason, many reformers call 
for allowing institutional appeals of arbitral awards. Not only could this be a 
means of error correction, it could have a harmonizing effect to avoid 
inconsistent decisions and promote higher quality decision-making by 
adjudicators.463
The most important argument against arbitration stressed in the Law 
and Economics literature is its lack of positive externalities.464 It is also 
questionable whether the traditional economic argument supporting 
commercial arbitration applies to the same extent to ISA. Commercial 
arbitration is supposed to be fast, cheap, high-quality, and impartial.465 Yet 
some argue that ICSID decision-making is slow, extremely expensive, and 
(as a result of the bias in selecting arbitrators) also not as impartial as 
developing countries would prefer.466 The empirical evidence supports this 
position.467 Moreover, the fact that elderly, white, and male arbitrators—
largely connected to the corporate world—often arbitrate cases also 
provides at least a suggestion of bias toward investors and against 
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462. Hafner-Burton & Victor, supra note 363, at 169.
463. Brown, supra note 402, at 683–84.
464. Cf. Landes & Posner, supra note 60, at 238–239.
465. See supra Parts II.A & II.B.
466. Franck, supra note 144, at 829.
467. See supra Part V.
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developing countries.468 In that sense, it is not surprising that developing 
countries are very critical of the current ICSID model.469
The Law and Economics literature shows that both judges and 
arbitrators strive for utility maximization.470 But judges are, in most legal 
systems, nominated for life,471 and, especially at the highest level, cannot 
obtain more income by providing better quality decisions.472 The incentive 
structure of the judiciary is therefore different than that of arbitrators, who 
are nominated for specific engagements and are more likely to be selected in 
future disputes if they appear reasonable and avoid decisions that are overly 
punitive.473 Those different incentives have to be taken into account if 
dispute resolution concerning investment moves toward a court system. 
How can such a system guarantee that its new judges will still have 
adequate incentives for high quality decision-making in the public interest?
It is also interesting to note the growing trend of empirical literature on 
investment-related disputes.474 Especially striking are the number of studies 
that are related to the question of why developing countries have negative 
sentiments concerning ISA.475 Most claimants are indeed investors from the 
developed world, and most claims are launched against developing states.476
The amounts claimed (but not necessarily the amounts awarded) are also 
rising to levels alarming to developing countries.477 And there seems to be 
some evidence of a bias in favor of investors from the North, even though 
the results of empirical studies are nuanced in this regard.478 Consequently, 
the subjectively negative perception of the ISA system is understandable, 
especially since arbitrators largely come from the North and have very 
strong connections to the corporate world to which the claiming investors 
are connected.479
For that reason, it is also not surprising that a large amount of literature 
deals with suggestions to reform the system, either within the current ICSID 
model or by moving toward alternatives.480 In that respect there is 
undoubtedly much more to be addressed; some ideas that warrant 
consideration exceed the scope of this paper, like the actual desirability and 
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empirical support for an investment court rather than the current ISA 
system, and whether such a court should be multilateral or bilateral. 
However, at the least, the theoretical Law and Economics literature and 
empirical studies reviewed in this paper both provide some support for 
development from the current ad hoc arbitration system to a more 
institutionalized investment court system. Though concrete issues relating to 
institutional design could not be discussed in any amount of detail at this 
stage, some of the literature introduced here—for instance, the remarkable 
publication by Brown—holds useful insights for those issues.
An interesting question is whether it is possible to develop a third way: 
A hybrid model between pure arbitration and a pure court system that would 
in some way or another keep “the best of both worlds.” Judicialization 
would have the economic advantage of generating public good as a result of 
transparent and public decision-making. But some of the advantages of the 
traditional arbitration system (like the higher expertise of arbitrators) could 
provide input for the reform of the system. For example, adjudication could 
take place via courts with independent judges specialized in investor-state 
arbitration, and parties would benefit from this capacity-building, relying on 
judges’ expertise for effective and speedy decision-making. On rendering 
their decisions, the judges would be providing a public good: transparent, 
precedential interpretation of the parties’ agreement. If those judges come 
from different regions of the world (and not only the “white” North) a 
higher degree of acceptability in the developing world could be virtually 
guaranteed. Moreover, under these conditions, decision-making could 
probably be even cheaper and speedier than under the current ad hoc
arbitration model.

